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Mastering the Basics, Volume Three

Making Good Shape

by Rob van Zeijst and Richard Bozulich

Good shape is a subject that has received scant attention in Japanese go literature. Although references to shape can be found in most books, there is no one book devoted exclusively to this subject. However, understanding and recognizing good shape is important for becoming a strong player and developing the intuition that will instantly guide you to finding the strongest moves in the opening and the middle-game fighting.

The brain is made up of two hemispheres whose functions are different but complementary. The right hemisphere is superior in handling geometrical concepts and the left hemisphere is superior in handling analytical processes. Playing go involves an interesting interplay between these two abilities. The right hemisphere provides the geometrical vision necessary to see the shape that you wish to achieve while the left hemisphere provides the analysis that is needed to achieve that shape. Studying shape is an excellent vehicle for developing and integrating both the geometrical and analytical powers of the brain.

The first chapter begins with an extensive theoretical introduction to shape, beginning with the efficient placement of stones. It then goes on to discuss thickness — how to use it and how to counter it, and how, if used improperly, it can result in the overconcentration of stones. It continues by contrasting the concept of thick stones with that of thin stones, then finally explains what are heavy stones and what are light stones, and how these relate to the important concept of sabaki, which is essentially a method for making good shape.

The second chapter gives examples of the standard shapes, both good and bad, such as ponnuki, empty triangles, the center of three stones, the head of two and three stones, etc.

The third chapter consists of a more than two hundred problems to give readers the practice needed to hone their ability to find the shape move in their games.

Volume Three: Making Good Shape

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The cover: The right and center panels of an oban triptych by Kunisada (signing as Toyokuni III) entitled *Three Women in Moonlight*. Published by Maruya Jimpachi ca. 1846–47.

The moon subject from the series of three triptychs, *Furyu getsu-sekka* (Elegant Moon, Snow, and Cherry Blossoms). It includes familiar elements characteristic of Genji prints: the Heian-style lantern and the pattern — the Genji family crest — of the kimono worn by the woman in the back panel. From the collection of Erwin Gerstorfer.

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Go World News

August–October 2002

by John Power

International



Yi Se-tol (right) wins what will probably be only the first of many world championships.

15th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol's first world title

Yi Se-tol is rapidly emerging from the shadow of the older Yi. At the age of 19, he has won his first world title, the 15th Fujitsu Cup. That doesn't quite match Ch'ang-ho's record of taking a world title at 16, but it certainly establishes him as the second great prodigy of the international era in go. Moreover, to score this triumph he had to overcome the opposition of two members of the Korean 'big three'. His bold, aggressive style is also winning him fans.

The final and the play-off for 3rd place were held at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo on 3 August. Playing white, Yi defeated Yu Ch'ang-hyeok by

half a point. In the play-off for 3rd place, O Meien 9-dan, representing Japan, defeated Yi Ch'ang-ho to secure his best result yet in an international tournament; playing black, O won by the same margin as in the final.

Yi Se-tol's final and semifinal games are presented in this issue.

China dominates 7th Samsung Cup

Chinese players have been doing very well recently in international tournaments, and some observers attribute it to a rise in level thanks to the highly competitive intercity team tournament that is so popular with Chinese go fans. In the 7th Samsung Cup, Chinese players took six of the eight quarterfinal places, then three of the semifinal places, which is their best result yet in an international tournament. The star for China was the 20-year-old Hu Yaoyu 7-dan, who defeated Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan in the second round; in the first round, Yi had eliminated another young Chinese star, the 19-year-old Qiu Jun 6-dan.

The only worry for China: Korea's Cho Hun-hyeon, the top performer in international go recently, has also made it to the semifinals.

A note from the editor

This issue of *Go World* is a special. We have taken advantage of the availability of some excellent game commentaries to present complete coverages of two fascinating title matches: the Judan and the Honinbo. Rather than split up the latter over two issues, we have expanded this issue to 80 pages to fit in all six games and have omitted some of our regular instructional articles. These will be restored in GW97.

*Results to date:**Round 1 (28 August, Seoul)*

Luo Xihe 9-dan (China) (W) defeated Yang Chae-ho 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Zhang Wendong 9-dan (China) (B) d. Pak Chin-sol¹ 1-dan (Korea) by resig.; Peng Quan 5-dan (China) (B) d. Yamada Kimio 8-dan (Japan) by resig.; Cao Dayuan 9-dan (China) (B) d. Yi Se-tol 3-dan (Korea) by resig.; Hu Yaoyu 7-dan (China) (B) d. Pak Seung-mun 4-dan (Korea) by resig.; Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) (B) d. Seo Pong-su 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (W) d. Ch'oe Weon-yong² 1-dan (Korea) by resig.; Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Yang I 5-dan (China) by resig.; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) (B) d. Duan Rong 7-dan (China) by 3½; Wang Yuhui 7-dan (China) (W) d. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 3-dan (Korea) by 6½; Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Wang Xi 4-dan (China) by resig.; Ch'oe Myeong-hun 8-dan (Korea) (B) b. Kong Jie 7-dan (China) by 2½; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Qiu Jun 6-dan (China) by resig.; Yang Keon 6-dan (Korea) (W) d. O Meien 9-dan (Japan) by 4½; Wang Lei 8-dan (China) (B) d. Takemiya Masaki 9-dan (Japan) by 6½; Pak Yeong-hun³ 3-dan (Korea) (W) d. Yu Bin 9-dan (China) by ½.

Round 2 (30 August, Seoul)

Luo Xihe (China) (W) d. Yang Keon (Korea) by resig.; Hu Yaoyu (China) (W) d. Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea) by resig.; Cho Hun-hyeon (Korea) (B) d. Peng Quan (China) by 1½; Ch'oe Myeong-hun (Korea) (B) d. Zhang Wendong (China) by resig.; Wang Lei (China) (B) d. Kobayashi Satoru (Japan) by resig.; Chang Hao (China) (W) d. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok (Korea) by resig.; Cao Dayuan (China) (B) b. Pak Yeong-hun (Korea) by resig.; Wang Yuhui (China) (W) b. Hane Naoki (Japan) by 1½.

Quarterfinals

(16 October) Wang Yuhui (China) (W) d. Chang Hao (China) by resig.; Wang Lei (China) (W) d. Ch'oe Myeong-hun (Korea) by 2½.

(17 October) Cho Hun-hyeon (Korea) (B) d. Luo Xihe (China) by ½; Hu Yaoyu (China) (W) d. Cao Dayuan (China) by resig.

Qualifying tournament. The Samsung Cup is unique in that all non-seeded professionals can compete in the Korean qualifying tournament (held in Seoul from 25 to 29 July). This year a

record 72 players from the Nihon Ki-in and the Kansai Ki-on made the trip to Seoul, but none got through to the main tournament. Eight, including Sakai Hideyuki 5-dan, former WAGC champion, got to the final round, but all lost. In the end, six Koreans and ten Chinese took the places on offer.

Toyota & Denso Cup: China vs. Korea in final

Three rounds of the 1st Toyota & Denso Cup World Go Oza were held at the Nihon Ki-in in early September. Chinese players again did very well, taking three of the four semifinal places; the final will feature a clash between the Chinese and Korean number ones, Chang Hao and Yi Ch'ang-ho.

The biggest surprise came in the second round. Fernando Aguilar of Argentina followed up his win over Hasegawa Sunao 9-dan in the first round with yet another victory against a 9-dan; this time he defeated Yo Kagen. This is the best performance yet by an amateur player in a world championship. In the third round, Aguilar ran into someone not even he could handle: Yi Ch'ang-ho.

*Results to date:**Round 2 (2 September)*

O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) (B) defeated Chen Zude 9-dan (China) by resig.; O Meien 9-dan (Japan) (B) d. Yang Shihai 8-dan (Chinese Hong Kong) by resig.; Fernando Aguilar (Argentina) (B) d. Yo Kagen 9-dan (Japan) by 2½; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Yamashita Keigo 7-dan (Japan) by 1½; Wang Lei 8-dan (China) (B) d. Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) by 2½; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) (B) d. Shao Weigang 9-dan (China) by resig.; Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (W) d. Pak Chi-eun 3-dan (Korea) by resig.; Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (B) d. Yi Se-tol 3-dan (Korea) by resig.

Round 3 (4 September)

Wang Lei (China) (B) d. O Rissei (Japan) by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho (B) d. Fernando Aguilar (Argentina) by resig.; Chang Hao (China) (B) d. O Meien 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (B) d. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok (Korea) by 4½.

Semifinals (6 September)

Chang Hao (W) d. Wang Lei by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho (W) d. Yu Bin by resig.

The best-of-three final will be played in January 2003.

¹ Pak is 15 and qualified for the Samsung Cup just 79 days after becoming a professional.

² Given name was formerly Min-sik, but he changed it in June this year (information courtesy of John Fairbairn).

³ We have been spelling the last part of his name as 'hyeon', but it should be 'hun' (correction from JF).

Korea's great start in 4th Nong Shim

Korea has got off to a roaring start in the 4th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup, a tournament for five-player teams from Japan, China and Korea, with Pak Yeong-hun 3-dan (all of 17 years old) winning all the four games played in the opening round in Beijing. The results:

Beijing round

1 (22 Oct.). Pak Yeong-hun (Korea) (B) beat Gu Li 7-dan (China) by resig.

2 (23 Oct.) Pak (W) beat O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) by resig.

3 (24 Oct.). Pak (W) beat Chang Hao 9-dan (China) by 2½.

4 (25 Oct.). Pak (B) beat Cho U 7-dan (Japan) by ½.

Korea has dominated the eight terms of this tournament and its predecessor, the Jinro Cup. This year, for the first time, Japan has fielded its top title-holders, O Kisei, Yoda Meijin and Kato Honinbo; together with Kobabashi Koichi Gosei and Cho U, holder of the NHK Cup, they add up to Japan's strongest team ever, but will it make a difference?

Korea wins China-Korea King of the New Stars play-off

This year the fifth play-off between the holders of the Korean and Chinese New Stars titles was held. These may be junior titles, but the representatives this year were 'junior' only in age. Korea was represented by Yi Se-tol 3-dan and China by Peng Quan 4-dan. The former prevailed by a 2-1 margin and gave Korea its third victory in this play-off.

The results:

Game 1 (30 June). Yi (W) by 4½.

Game 2 (1 July). Peng (W) by resig.

Game 3 (3 July). Yi (B) by resig.

Since we missed this tournament in *The Go Player's Almanac*, here are the details to date.

1 (1998). Mok Chin-seok 4-dan (Korea) d. Shao Junjie 4-dan (China) 2-1.

2 (1999). Kim Man-su 4-dan (Korea) d. Hu Yaoyu 5-dan (China) 2-0.

3 (2000). Liu Shizhen 5-dan (China) d. Yi Sang-hun 3-dan (Korea) 2-0.

4 (2001). Gu Li 5-dan (China) d. Cho Han-seung 4-dan (Korea) 2-1.

Korea wins China-Korea Tianyuan/Chunweon play-off

This year the sixth play-off between the holders of the Korean Chunweon and Chinese Tianyuan titles was held, and, like all but one of the previous play-offs, was won by Korea.

Last year Chang Hao had redeemed China's honour by defeating Yi Se-tol 2-0 (see GW93), but this year things reverted to the usual pattern. Pak Yeong-hun 3-dan of Korea defeated Huang Yizhong 6-dan of China 2-1. Poor Huang had earlier lost the Japan-China Tengen play-off also (see GW95).

The results:

Game 1 (21 Aug.). Pak (W) by resig.

Game 2 (23 Aug.). Huang (W) by resig.

Game 3 (24 Aug.). Pak (W) by 6½.

Current international champions

3rd Chunlan Cup: Yu Ch'ang-hyeok (Korea)

6th Samsung Cup: Cho Hun-hyeon (Korea)

6th LG Cup: Yu Ch'ang-hyeok (Korea)

15th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol (Korea)

14th TV Asia Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)

1st Haojue Cup (Women's): Yun Yeong-seon (Korea)

1st Toyota & Denso Cup: Chang Hao (China) or Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)

3rd Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup: Korea

Most world championships won

16: Yi Ch'ang-ho

10: Cho Hun-hyeon

6: Takemiya Masaki, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok

4: Yoda Norimoto

2: Otake Hideo, Ma Xiaochun,
Yu Bin, O Rissei

1: Kobayashi Koichi, Rin Kaiho,
Cho Chikun, Seo Pong-su, Yi Se-tol

Team championships

(Jinro, Nong Shim, Okinawa)

9: Korea

News from Japan


Japan switches to 6½-point komi

Nearly half a century after switching from a 4½-point komi to 5½, Japan has decided to increase the komi to 6½ points. This brings Japan into line with the other major go-playing countries: Korea started the changeover to a 6½-point komi earlier this year and China switched to 3¾ in spring this year (the Chinese komi is actually equivalent to 7½ points, but under the Chinese system of counting there's no equivalent to 6½, so, in Japanese terms, they went from 5½ to 7½).

This decision was made by a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in in September. The new komi will be gradually implemented after negotiations with the Kansai Ki-in and tournament sponsors have been completed.

The main factor in the decision was a survey of about 15,000 tournament games from 1996 to 2001 that showed that Black won 51.86% of all games. The advantage of close to 4% over White was convincing.

The first tournament to switch to the 5½ komi was the Oza in 1955. For a long time afterwards, it was referred to as a 'large komi'. One wonders what professionals will say about the new komi.



Cho Chikun

Cho tops Sakata's record

For the last two decades, the biggest record in Japanese go has been Sakata Eio's lifetime tally of 64 titles. Sakata set this record on 5 March 1983 when he won the 2nd NEC Cup; he was 63 years old. Everyone has known for a long time that the player to beat it would be Cho Chikun. In the late 90s, when he held the triple crown (Kisei,

Meijin & Honinbo), it looked as if that day was approaching rapidly, but then Cho faltered, losing his titles one by one and becoming a simple 9-dan in 2000. However, he resumed his winning ways, though in more modest fashion, winning two fast-go titles and the Oza last year. That took his tally to 63.

On 17 August, Cho defeated Ishida Yoshio 9-dan in the final of the 35th Haya-go (fast go) Championship, so he finally drew level with Sakata, 29 years after winning his first title, the 5th Shin'ei (New Stars), in 1973. Results of TV games are usually kept secret until they are televised, but, in view of the significance of this win, it was published immediately.

On 13 October 2002, Cho defeated Cho U 7-dan in the final of the 9th Agon Kiriya Cup, so, at the age of 46, he had finally broken Sakata's record. This was his first victory in this tournament. Cho: 'I don't think that as a competitor I have topped Sakata, but it's a great honour. I feel like jumping for joy.'

If Cho keeps winning titles until the same age as Sakata, 100 titles may well be a realistic target.

Top title winners

1. Cho Chikun: 65	6. Rin Kaiho: 35
2. Sakata Eio: 64	7. Yoda Norimoto: 31
3. Kobayashi K.: 56	8. Ishida Yoshio: 24
4. Otake Hideo: 48	Takemiya Masaki: 24
5. Kato Masao: 46	10. Fujisawa Shuko: 23

Kobayashi defends Gosei title

After making a bad start in the 27th Gosei title match, Yuki Satoshi 9-dan recovered in the third game and scored a convincing win. That added a lot of interest to the title match, but the defending champion, Kobayashi Koichi, squashed his comeback in the fourth game; he seemed to bring all his vastly greater experience to bear, and Yuki found himself outmatched. The Kansai Ki-in had hoped that Yuki would bring its title drought to an end, but it is going to have to wait for another day.

This is Kobayashi's ninth Gosei title and his 55th overall.

The results:

- Game 1 (3 July). Kobayashi (B) by 3½.
- Game 2 (18 July). Kobayashi (W) by resig.
- Game 3 (26 July). Yuki (W) by 3½.
- Game 4 (21 August). Kobayashi (W) by resig.

Yoda defends Meijin title

Cho outright winner of the Meijin league

The final round of the 27th Meijin league was held at the Nihon Ki-in on 1 August, with just three players, Cho Chikun (6-1), Ryu Shikun (5-2), and Yamashita Keigo (5-2), still in the running. It was not enough for Ryu and Yamashita just to win their games — they needed Cho to lose. Yamashita was in the toughest position, since he needed Ryu to lose as well (because of his higher rank in the league, only Ryu would qualify for a play-off with Cho if he and Yamashita had the same score).

As it turned out, all three won, so all these calculations became irrelevant. Cho beat Cho Sonjin, Ryu beat Rin Kaiho, and Yamashita beat O Rissei. Cho therefore secured a return match with Yoda in just the second year after losing the title; their previous match was a disaster, with Cho losing 0-4, but history seemed to be on his side this time: he had never lost a challenge for a big-three title (in seven attempts).

The tie for 6th place between O Rissei and Hikosaka was settled by a play-off, held on 5 August and won by O.

The title match: Yoda in superb form

Cho Chikun's unblemished record as big-three challenger finally came to an end when he ran into a title holder in peak form. Yoda Norimoto dropped just one game in defending his title. He thus maintained the dominance over Cho that he established when he took the Meijin title from him in 2000. Cho seems to find Yoda's style, which is also fairly territorial, hard to handle. Yoda's ten-year age advantage on Cho may also make a difference in two-day games.

The last game epitomized the series. Cho, who starts to experiment very early in the fuseki, played an unheard-of tenuki in a standard joseki. This was only the first of a number of innovative moves he played — the players in the pressroom went wrong time after time in guessing the next move. However, Yoda didn't bat an eyelid: he went toe-to-toe with Cho throughout the game and he came up with his own surprises — and some very clever moves. In the end, he proved the stronger player in this arena.

This is Yoda's third Meijin title in a row and his 31st title overall. He seems so strong in this tournament that he may well emulate Cho and establish his own dynasty

Results:

Game 1 (11, 12 Sept., Beijing). Yoda (W) by resig.

Game 2 (25, 26. Sept.). Yoda (B) by 2½.

Game 3 (2, 3 Oct.). Cho (B) by 2½.

Game 4 (16, 17 Oct.). Yoda (B) by ½.

Game 5 (23, 24 Oct.). Yoda (W) by resig.

New member of the Meijin league

So far, only one of the vacant places in the 28th Meijin league has been filled. It goes to Cho U 7-dan, who is now a member of all three leagues. He will be making his Meijin-league debut.

Pairings in the other two play-offs for league places are Morita Michihiro 9-dan vs. Mizokami Tomochika 7-dan and Takemiya Masaki 9-dan vs. Kudo Norio 9-dan.

O Meien challenging for Oza title

The challenger to Cho Chikun for the 50th Oza title is O Meien, and the match is tied 1-all.

The first game was played in Shanghai to commemorate the 30th year of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China and the 50th anniversary of the founding of the go and shogi titles, both sponsored by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Newspaper). (Game 3 of the shogi title match was played the day before the go game.) O Meien (B) took the lead, but late in the endgame he neglected to make a necessary reinforcement inside one of his groups and was forced to resign.

The second game, played on 31 October, had a very unusual result: Cho lost on time. In his last minute of byo-yomi, Cho didn't notice O move and so didn't realize it was his time that was being counted out.

Kobayashi wins Ryusei title

Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan is also creeping up on Sakata's old record. He has just won his 56th title, defeating O Meien 9-dan in the final of the 11th Ryusei title. Playing black, Kobayashi won by 6½ points. (The game was telecast on 27 September and 5 October.)

27th Kisei: Ryu and Yamashita win leagues

The A league was decided in the fourth round on 12 September. Ryu Shikun 7-dan beat Nakaonoda Tomomi 8-dan, taking him to 4-0. Hane Naoki Tengen, the only other player still in the running, lost to Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan on the

27th Meijin league (6 December 2001 to 1 August 2002)

Title-holder: Yoda Norimoto

Player/Opponent	R.K.	C.C.	R.S.	C.S.	O.M.	K.M.	O.R.	H.N.	Y.K.	won/lost
5. Rin Kaiho	---	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	4-4
1. Cho Chikun	1	---	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	7-1
2. Ryu Shikun	1	0	---	1	1	1	1	0	1	6-2
-- Cho Sonjin	0	0	0	---	0	0	1	0	0	1-7
4. O Meien	0	0	0	1	---	1	1	1	1	5-3
-- Kato Masao	0	0	0	1	0	---	0	0	0	1-7
6. O Rissei	1	0	0	0	0	1	---	1	0	3-5
-- Hikosaka Naoto	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	---	0	3-5
3. Yamashita Keigo	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	---	6-2

27th Kisei A League (6 June to 10 October 2002)

Place	Player/Opponent	RS	HN	MT	IY	YN	NT	Score
1	Ryu Shikun 7-dan	—	1	1	1	1	1	5-0
2	Hane Naoki Tengen	0	—	0	1	1	1	3-2
—	Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan	0	1	—	0	0	0	1-4
4	Ishida Yoshio 9-dan	0	0	1	—	0	1	2-3
3	Yoda Norimoto Meijin	0	0	1	1	—	1	3-2
—	Nakaonoda Tomomi 8-dan	0	0	1	0	0	—	1-4

27th Kisei B League (13 June to 28 October 2002)

Rank	Player/Opponent	CC	CU	AS	CS	KS	YK	Score
4	Cho Chikun Oza	—	1	1	0	0	0	2-3
2	Cho U 7-dan	0	—	0	1	1	1	3-2
—	Awaji Shuzo 9-dan	0	1	—	0	0	0	1-4
—	Cho Sonjin 9-dan	1	0	1	—	0	0	2-3
3	Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan	1	0	1	1	—	0	3-2
1	Yamashita Keigo 7-dan	1	0	1	1	1	—	4-1

same day, dropping back to 3-1. Their final-round game had been expected to decide the winner of the league, but became irrelevant — even if Hane won, drawing even with Ryu on 4-1, the latter would take precedence because of his higher ranking, as there is no play-off within a Kisei league. Even if he lost, Hane would still take second place. That is what happened, so Ryu ended up two points clear of the field.

The B league was not decided until the fifth round on 28 October. Yamashita Keigo 7-dan won his game and Cho U 7-dan lost his, so

the former will meet Ryu in the play-off to decide the Kisei challenger. It will be held on 14 November.

Cho U wins King of the New Stars

The 27th King of the New Stars title match featured a clash between two top young players: Cho U and Takao Shinji, both 7-dan and aged 22 and 25 respectively. Recently, Cho U has begun to establish himself as a top-flight player, with his Honinbo challenge last year and his NHK victory earlier this year, but he had always done

58th Honinbo league (3 October 2002~spring 2003)

Title-holder: Kato Masao

Player/Opponent	O.M.	CU.	C.S.	C.C.	K.K.	R.K.	R.S.	Y.K.	won/lost
1. O Meien	---				1				1-0
2. Cho U		---					1		1-0
3. Cho Sonjin			---					1	1-0
4. Cho Chikun				---		1			1-0
5. Kobayashi Koichi	0				---				0-1
5. Rin Kaiho				0		---			0-1
5. Ryu Shikun		0					---		0-1
5. Yamashita Keigo			0					---	0-1

badly in the King of the New Stars title, never reaching the best eight before this year. Takao, on the other hand, had won this title in 1996 as a 19-year-old 5-dan.

In this match, Cho he proved too much for Takao, securing victory with two straight wins. Winning this title is often the prelude to bigger things (such as winning a league), but Cho has reversed the usual pattern.

The results:

Game 1 (16 Sept.). Cho (W) by 3½.

Game 2 (30 Sept.). Cho (B) by resig.

58th Honinbo league

Only one round has been played in the new league, and the results favour the 'status quo' in the league, with all the newcomers losing. Incidentally, Yamashita Keigo is making his league debut.

Women's Honinbo title match tied

Chinen Kaori, Women's Kisei, who is expecting her third child at the end of the year, made a good start to her challenge for the 21st Women's Honinbo title, winning the first two games of the best-of-five, but Kobayashi Izumi fought back strongly in the next two games to even the score. The final game will be played on 30 October.

Results to date:

Game 1 (26 Sept.). Chinen (B) by resig.

Game 2 (2 Oct.). Chinen (W) by 2½.

Game 3 (9 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) by 4½.

Game 4 (23 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by ½.

Promotions

To 8-dan: Yanaka Katsunori, Takanashi Seiken

To 7-dan: Shinoda Hideyuki, Takahashi Hideo

To 6-dan: Han Zenki

To 5-dan: Ms. Umezawa Yukari, Ms. Yashiro Kumiko, Araki Issei

To 4-dan: Yamamoto Kentaro, Yamamori Tadanao, Iwamaru Taira, Ms. Aoba Kaori

To 3-dan: Mochizuki Ken'ichi, Ms. Suzuki Ayumi

To 2-dan: Iyama Yuta, Ko Iso, Ohashi Hirofumi, Kim Hyon-jon, Kawada Kohei

Cho Sonjin becomes Tengen challenger

When Yamashita Keigo 7-dan reached the play-off to decide the challenger for the 28th Tengen player, go fans looked forward to a title match between him and Hane Naoki, the two top players of the younger generation. However, a senior player had different ideas. In the play-off, held on 3 October at the Nihon Ki-in, the 32-year-old Cho Sonjin 9-dan turned out to have just one more ko threat than Yamashita and so he won the game, playing white, by half a point.

The title match starts on 7 November.

Cho U sets Oteai record

On 10 October, Cho U 7-dan set a new record in the Oteai by going without a loss for 37 games. That breaks a record set by Cho Chikun back in 1973. Cho U's run included one jigo.

Cho's total record to date in the Oteai is impressive: 74 wins, 7 losses, 2 jigo. With black, it is 40-1-1.

Ishida Yoshio still holds the record for most successive wins in the Oteai, at 30, but Yamashita Keigo is moving up on it fast and at present has 21 wins in a row.

News from Korea on page 40

The 15th Fujitsu Cup

Yi Se-tol's first international triumph

The youngest current world champion played brilliantly to win his first international trophy. Below, we present his semifinal and final games to show how he did it.

Semifinal: Yi vs. Yi

White: Yi Se-tol 3-dan

Black: Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan

Komi: 5½; time; 3 hours each.

Played at the Toyo Hotel in Osaka on 6 July 2002. *Commentary by Goto Shungo 9-dan.*

The older Yi had a big lead in previous encounters between these two: nine wins to four losses. The younger Yi had started well, winning three of their first five games, but the older Yi had then dominated, with seven wins to one loss. It was about time for Se-tol to redress the balance to prevent Ch'ang-ho from becoming his nemesis. However, the latter drew black, with which he is very hard to beat, for this game.

Goto had an interesting comment on Yi Se-tol: 'The young Korean players are very advanced in their study of local variations, so sometimes up until the middle game their games are just venues for publishing the results of their researches. The down side of this is that their games may lack individuality.' Yi, however, is different. He relies on his fighting strength: he sets up moyos, makes the opponent invade and unleashes his power in the confused fighting that results. This game follows that pattern.

Figure 1 (1-24). *Profit vs. moyo*

The opening to 8 is often seen. Instead of 9, the large-knight move of A is more common, but, after sinking into thought for 30 minutes (slow play for a short game like this), Ch'ang-ho made the approach move of 9. This is a special strategy.

White 10. White 11 is Black's 'order'; after Black B-White C, Black D, a combination pincer and extension, would be a good point.

Black 15. Black 1 in *Dia. 1* would also be a good move. After the more-or-less inevitable continuation to 10, Black 11 would be the junc-





Figure 1 (1-24)



Dia. 1: also good for Black

tion point of both moyos. Goto: 'Probably most professionals would like this shape.' Ch'ang-ho spent 19 minutes on 15, which perhaps shows he had difficulty discarding this variation.

Black 19 is a rather restrained extension, but without it White E will be big.

White 22, 24. The contrast between Se-tol's moyo style and Ch'ang-ho's territorial style is starting to become explicit. Black's next move will be the key point of the opening.






Figure 2 (25-42)
32: connects



Dia. 2: good for Black



Dia. 3: White cuts

Figure 2 (25-42). A blow at the vital point

Black 25. Invading at A or B at the top would be natural. If Black B, White C and Black D would follow, and the balance of power would by no means be unfavourable to Black. However, Ch'ang-ho chose to start operations in the top left corner.

Black 27 is an ingenious move. Goto: 'It may be a new move. This is the kind of position that professionals like to research.' According to Goto, you can't expect a good result from moves like E or 31.

White 28 shows Se-tol's determination not to let Black live easily. If instead White 1 in Dia. 2, Black gets 'a splendid life' (Goto) with 2 to 8.

Black 33. Black is prepared to give up the corner stones if he can extend to A. White 34 preempts that.

Black plays 39 to cover his thinness. If he simply jumps to 41, that is, 1 in Dia. 3, White

can separate him with the 4-6 combination.

White 42 is the vital point for stopping Black from getting out.






Figure 3 (43-60)



Dia. 4: a deadly wedge




Dia. 5: Black lives

Figure 3 (43-60). White's slack play

Can Black get out? If Black plays 45 at 46, White 2 and 4 in Dia. 4 will be severe: Black will probably collapse. That's why Black makes the diagonal move of 45. This is a good move; next, it threatens to split White into two with A.

White 46 in response is also a good move, but 52 is a slack move that takes gote. As seen in the game later (84 to 87), Black can live if he gives up three stones as in Dia. 5. If White plays 3 at 4, Black 'a' forces White 'b', so Black can make a



Dia. 6: sente for White

second eye here.

If, instead of 52, White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* first [it's harder to give up the three stones before White invests an extra stone at 5], then extends at 5, Black is forced to live in gote with 6. This result would apparently be good for White. In the game, Ch'ang-ho tenukies and plays first on the right side with 53, thus seizing the initiative. He must have been surprised at his good fortune.

Se-tol expands his moyo with 54, but there is a subtle point here. Instead of choosing to set up a large moyo, he is now being forced to resort to it.

Black 57 is an all-out move; the fight shifts to the bottom.





Figure 4 (61-100)


Figure 4 (61-100). A high-level counter

Black 63. Black wants White to set up a ladder with 1 in *Dia. 7*; he considers linking up with 2 and 4 good enough. White 64, thwarting this, is a good move. Goto: 'Black would like to punish White for this move, but he can't find a suitable way to do so.' For example, if Black extends up

with 1 in *Dia. 8*, White may launch a ko fight up to 8.



Dia. 7: Black is satisfied




Dia. 8: a ko Black doesn't want

Ch'ang-ho, being Ch'ang-ho, comes up with a high-level counter punch: a sacrifice manoeuvre involving five stones from 65 on. This enables him to fix up his shape up to 77. Se-tol now sets about fencing off his moyo with 78 and 82.

Black 83 is part of a far-reaching plan. If Black later connects at A and gets to separate White with B, then Black can attack with C or D. However, according to Goto: 'Yi Ch'ang-ho seems to have made a miscalculation. He may have underestimated the potential of White's moyo, assuming that the centre territory wouldn't expand very much.' Goto said he would have preferred using 83 to reduce the centre with Black 90.

Se-tol settles the shape at the top with 84 and 86. As mentioned above, 87 secures a seki: *Dia. 9* shows how. If White 3, Black 4 creates a seki. If White plays 3 at 4, Black 3 also secures a seki.



Dia. 9: seki

Se-tol now starts to show his strength. First of all, White 92 is a strong move. Cutting at 94 becomes sente; White then switches to 96 and in a flash he has secured a promising game. At the public commentary held at the hotel, Goto commented: 'If White converts this moyo into terri-

tory untouched, he'll probably win.'

Black 99 aims to reduce the white moyo, but a subsidiary aim is, by cutting at E, to force White to take the five captured black stones off the board.





Figure 5 (101-130)



Dia. 10: Ch'ang-ho's plan

Figure 5 (101-130). A spectacular exchange


White 10 hopes to swallow up the three black stones nearby.

White 12. White would usually answer Black 11 by blocking at 13, but Se-tol ataries instead. Ch'ang-ho in turn ignores that with 13, so Se-tol takes compensation with 14. According to Goto, each of these moves is, in its own way, inevitable.

If, instead of 12, White intercepts with 1 in Dia. 10, Black will use some sacrifice stones to resurrect his centre stones, after which he lays waste to the centre with 14. This diagram reveals that Ch'ang-ho's earlier moves to the left were exquisite preparatory moves — but Se-tol's antennae sensed the danger.

Black 13. If at 1 in Dia. 11, White will play 2

to 10, after which Black has to play 11 to avoid the ladder. White then makes a diagonal connection with 12, and Black seems to have no chance of living in the centre.



Dia. 11: Se-tol's threat
9: connects

White 20, cutting across the knight's move, is a tesuji. Instead of 21, Black should have answered patiently at A. From this point, Se-tol sparkles. The moves from 24 to 28 are exquisitely timed. He creates a ko that threatens both the left and the right. Breaking through on the right side with 30 is then 'a knockout punch' (Goto). At one stroke, he has set up a win.




Figure 6 (131-165)
37: connects


Figure 6 (131-165). Taking a firm grip on the lead

Local skirmishes continue at the centre bottom. While considering 43, Ch'ang-ho went into


his final minute of byo-yomi, but his poker face hadn't changed one iota from the beginning of the game. The same was true of Se-tol: there was no way of telling from the players' expressions who was winning. But the story the board told was a victory for Se-tol.

Black 51 and 53 are big reducing moves, but the painful thing for Black is that White's right-side group is immune from attack, as he links up on the side with 52.

White 54 and 56 are shrewd endgame moves. Black has to reinforce at 59: tenuki would let White get a seki as in *Dia. 12*. If Black rejects the seki, playing at 2 in *Dia. 13*, White can start a ko.



Dia. 12: seki



Dia. 13: ko




Figure 7 (166–200)

Figure 7 (166–200). Black perishes.

White 70 not only takes territory but also threatens Black's eyes.

Goto (at the public commentary) predicted: 'Black will probably cut at 73, so the focus of the game will be the life and death of the black group.' That's what happened: 73 is a do-or-die move.


The cut succeeds — if the centre black group survives, the game will be close. However, Se-tol has read out long ago that it can't live. He has no trouble bringing it down.

Black resigns after White 100. He could push through at 1 in *Dia. 14*, but White gives way and captures the main part of the group with 2 to 6. This is enough to win.

This win, over his most feared opponent, was a very satisfying one for Yi.

Black resigns after White 200.

(Adapted from the *Yomiuri Newspaper*)



Dia. 14: White wins

Final: Yi vs. Yu

White: Yi Se-tol 3-dan (Korea)

Black: Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea)

Played at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo on 3 August 2002. *Commentary by Kojima Takaho 9-dan.*




Figure 1 (1–23)

Figure 1 (1–23). Yu's oversight

Yu played quickly up to 23, but White's answer to this last move seems to have come as a shock to him. Can you guess the move he overlooked?






Figure 2 (24-40)



Dia. 1: squeeze



Dia. 2: bad for Black

Figure 2 (24-40). Yi takes the lead.

The cut of 24 puts Black on the spot: he has no good answer. If he ataries at 1 in *Dia. 1*, White cuts at 2; if Black 3, White uses the sacrifice of 4 to set up a squeeze, which is awful for Black.

Another possibility is playing 25 at 1 in *Dia. 2*, but White lives at the top, forcing Black 13, then pulls out his stone with 14. This result is also clearly unfavourable for Black. Instead of 9, Black could play at 10, but White will be happy to hane at 9; even if Black captures with 'a', White is quite happy to break through with 'b'.

Consequently, Black has little choice about 25 in the figure, but when White plays 26 in sente, then forces with 28 and 30, Black is far from happy.

Jumping out to 40 makes excellent shape. White has already taken a definite lead.





Figure 3 (41-71)



Dia. 3: White wins

Figure 3 (41-71). A time to fight

On the whole, Korean go is quite territory-oriented, but Yu is an exception. He plays more for influence and is a redoubtable fighter. When he gets into trouble, he can rely on his fighting skills to win the day. In this game, he is faced with a situation in which he is going to have to fight very hard to get back into the game.

Black 41 is the first manifestation of this. He must feel he has to play here to start a fight, but 41 provokes 42, which is sente against the corner. Actually, there is something White has to check before he plays 42. Instead of 47 —

Dia. 3. Black might attack with 1. White counters with 2 etc. and after 10 he wins the capturing race; if Black 'a' next, White counters with 'b'.

After 47, Black has to come back and defend the corner with 49, but at least he has created a floating white group.

White 50. White should peep at 62.

White 56. This is another chance to peep at 62.

The peep at 62 comes too late: things are different now that Black had pushed in at 59, creating defects in White's shape. White has to submit to his forcing moves at 63 and 65.

Yi presumably thought that he could play the peep at any time, but this was a mistake. Black has gained in this fight.

White 68. If White cuts at A, Black 69 and White B follow; Black then connects at 68 and the white group is dead. If instead White cuts at 1 in *Dia. 4*, he can capture the black stones here, but connecting at 4 gives Black forcing moves against the white group. In fact, he makes an eye in sente on the side, which is big. Instead of 3 —





Figure 4 (72-100)



Dia. 4: good for Black


Dia. 5: dangerous

Dia. 5. If White 3 here, Black forces with 4, then attacks in the centre. This is quite dangerous for White.

Painful though it is, White has no choice but to cut at 68, though he hates playing so low. Black fixes up his shape with 69 and 71; if anything, the balance of power in the centre might even favour Black, so he has recovered from his bad start.

Figure 4 (72-100). Yu's slack move

Black 79. Black is now playing as if he has the upper hand.



Dia. 6: best for Black

Black 93. Perhaps Yu relaxed a little because he had caught up — this move is not rigorous enough. Most urgent is forcing with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*; White must defend at 4, so Black can then switch to 5 in the bottom right. This would probably put Black ahead, according to Kojima. If White plays at 6, Black can make a second eye with 7, followed by 9 and 11. This is a painful way to live, but playing the hane of Black 1 more than compensates.

Once White plays 94 and 96, the hane + connection may no longer be sente.

Black decides to attack with 97. This leads to a spectacular trade.




Figure 5 (101-135)
11: connects; 18: captures


Figure 5 (101-135). A good trade for White

The moves up to 19 follow inevitably, with each side capturing five stones. At first glance, Black may seem to have done well, but that's not the case. Kojima: 'Capturing the key black stones eliminates all the unpleasant aji in White's group at the top. This is significant.'

After the game, Yi commented that he thought Yu might have upset his lead after Black's attack in Figure 3, but after the trade here he felt that he had the lead. Going from the final result, that judgement was probably correct, which in itself testifies to his genius, as actually the real highlights of this game were still to come.

White 26 and 28 are severe. If Black uses 29 to cut at 30, White gets an excellent squeeze, starting with White 29, so Black has no choice about this move.

The focus of the game switches to the bottom with the invasion of 32. Black 33 in response is natural: it avoids giving White any help in settling his stone. If instead Black follows *Dia. 7*, White easily settles himself.



Dia. 7: good for White




Figure 6 (136-170)

Figure 6 (136-170). Yi sparkles.

White 36. Ishida Yoshio, who was giving a public commentary on the game, pointed out that White could win by just descending at 60, letting Black have all the right side. However, Yi has no intention of following such a moderate policy; instead, he sets out to lay waste to the right side.


Yu probably welcomed this: the side that is behind naturally hopes for complications.

White 40 is a superb move, backed up by deep reading. Black ignores it: he pushes along at 41, hoping to be able to swallow up all White's stones on the right side. Actually, he has no choice about 41. If instead he plays at 1 in *Dia. 8*, White pushes through and cuts with 2 and 4: Black has no answer. If Black 5, White 6 is perfect.


White 44, giving atari underneath, is the follow-up brilliancy to 40. The three white stones are captured after 45, but they remain a thorn in Black's side for the remainder of the fighting here.

First of all, the sacrifice gives White the sente moves of 46, 48, and 50, flattening out Black's side territory. White also gets some insurance in the form of a link-up at A.


Next, the hane of 52 also makes use of the three captured stones. They give Black such bad aji that he is severely hampered in the fight. For example, he is unable to resist White 56. If he tries to capture White with 1 in *Dia. 9*, he has no answer to White 4. That means he has no choice but to connect at 57.



Dia. 8: hopeless for Black



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

White 58 is also severe. After 62, Black would like to link up to the centre with 1 in *Dia. 10*, but once again the three captured stones make their presence felt. White ataries with 2 and 4, then hanes in at 6; Black can't play 7, as White captures him after 8. Ever since White's sacrifice, Black has been plagued by shortage of liberties in this corner.

Black is helpless to stop White from linking up with 64 and 66, in sente, moreover. When White switches to 68, he has a sure win.

Yi's play in this and the previous figure has been dazzling.

Figure 7 (171–200). *Endgame slip*

White 76. If instead at A, Black wouldn't be able to play 81. The latter move makes the game closer than it should have been.

Figure 8 (201–263)

The final margin, just half a point, is surprisingly close, but it doesn't affect the main impression of this game, which is of brilliant play by Yi.

In the early 90s, the top Korean players were the 'big four' of Cho Hun-hyeon, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok, Yi Ch'ang-ho, and Seo Pong-su. Seo's last big international success was defeating nine players in a row in the 5th Jinro Cup in 1997, since when he's dropped out of the limelight. That left the 'big three', but now the emergence of Yi Se-tol seems likely to expand that to a new 'big four'. Significantly, the main opposition he had to overcome to win the Fujitsu Cup was from

other Korean players. Undoubtedly, the first decade of the 21st century will witness more Yi triumphs.

White wins by ½ point.

(Adapted from the *Yomiuri Newspaper*. Fujitsu report translated by John Power.)




Figure 7 (171–200)




Figure 8 (201–263)

The 40th Judan Title Match: O Rissei vs. Takemiya

Takemiya has won the Judan title three times, but the last time was nine years ago. His last appearance in a title match was in the Meijin title seven years ago. He's been on vacation too long.

Takemiya: 'I'm satisfied with the content of my games in the Judan tournament. I'm in good physical condition, and my opponent, O Rissei, is the current number one, so I'm looking forward to the title match. I hope that I can play my own game.'

Kamimura Kunio (after Game Two): 'It's a good series, with both players playing their characteristic styles. In particular, there were many memorable moments in the second game, when Takemiya played white, with some magnificent attack and defence.'

We recommend that before reading our commentaries the reader just play through the game records to get a feel for the flow of the games. The contrast between the styles of these two players will make you appreciate anew the fascination of go — and give you some glimpses into its profundity. (*Konishi Taizo*)



Kamimura Kunio 9-dan

Our commentator on all five Judan games is Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Born on 18 March 1946, Kamimura became a Kitani disciple in 1957, the same year as Ishida Yoshio. He became 1-dan in 1962 and reached 9-dan in 1991. Although very talented, he failed to fulfil his

promise; his nickname at one time, 'the prodigal son of the Kitani school', perhaps gives a clue as to the reason. His main achievement was gaining a place in the 14th Meijin league in 1988. He is a popular teacher and, as this article shows, a rigorous analyst of go.

Game One: Centre shinogi secures victory

White: O Rissei Kisei & Judan

Black: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Komi: 5½; time: five hours each.

Played at the Takashimaya Inn, Iwamuro Hot Spring, Niigata Prefecture on 20 February 2002.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Konishi Taizo 7-dan




Figure 1 (1-41)

Figure 1 (1-41). Each goes his own way.

The first thing to catch the eye is the early 3-3 invasions of 10 and 24. Kamimura: 'This is probably a deliberate strategy by O Rissei to split the board up into small areas.'

This is a practical strategy, securing profit first, giving the opponent the centre moyo he is so fond of, reducing it as early as possible, and setting up a close game; it shows O's confidence in his *shinogi* (saving weak groups — see box next page) ability and his endgame. That's how

the game develops. Takemiya, of course, has no reason to be dissatisfied with this.

Black 11 shows that Black is emphasizing the bottom. If instead he blocks at 12 and a similar joseki follows, the earlier exchange of 5 for 6 will become a bad one.

Kamimura: 'I take my hat off to Black 31. This is an imaginative strategy, typical of Takemiya.'

If White answers by jumping to A, Black will set down roots with B and attack on a large scale. In the game, Black gets to block at 33 and can have no grounds for dissatisfaction.

Reducing with 34 is now urgent.

Black 39 and 41 force White into bad shape and deny him flexible eye shape. Takemiya was probably quite pleased with the way the game was developing for him at this point. Immediately after this, however, he played a move he regretted.





Figure 2 (42-64)



Dia. 1: better for Black

One of the themes of this year's Judan title match is the art of *shinogi*, a term which refers to rescuing a group under attack. *Shinogi* comes into play when a group is in actual danger of dying.

In contrast, *sabaki*, usually translated as 'settling' a group, refers to making light, flexible shape for one's stones so that it will be hard to attack them profitably. Often, this involves sacrificing some of the stones if the opponent does attack.

Players like Sakata Eio, Cho Chikun and O Rissei are famed for their *shinogi* skill.

Figure 2 (42-64). Soaking in a lukewarm bath

Takemiya: 'Black 47 was careless. This was my chance to launch an attack with A.' Kamimura: 'There's a danger that an attack with A might prove ineffective, giving Black a slack result. I don't think you can criticize the natural move of 47.'

Escaping into the centre with 50 takes the pressure off White.

White 56 would be perfect for a 'pick the next move' problem. Known popularly as 'the horse's face', this really feels like the only move. It fixes up White's shape, hampers Black's expansion of his left-side position, offers support from a distance to the weak white group in the centre — it kills three birds with one stone. On the backswing, so to speak, it also sets up White 60.

Kamimura: 'Answering on the left with 57 and 59 couldn't be more painful. But if White is allowed to strike through this area, even Black's group at the bottom will become thin, so he has no choice. That perhaps means that there was a problem in his play earlier.'

Kamimura recommended changing 53 to the high approach move in *Dia. 1*; after 2, Black occupies the large point of 3. This compels White to play 4, so Black secures the top with 5; if White plays 'a' on the left, 'b' is acceptable for Black.


Takemiya's original plan was to play Black 55 at B. Kamimura: 'If Black does so, White will occupy the large point of 55. Rather than making an approach move (53), then adding another stone at B, I feel that the high approach move is more in keeping with his style.'

Black meekly goes along with White 60 to 64 — this is like soaking in a lukewarm bath. Playing like this, there's no way he can make a con-


test of it territorially. Rin Kaiho, the referee, declared unequivocally: 'If nothing untoward happens, it will be hard for Black to win.'

Instead of 61, I would like to have seen Black counterattack with 1 in *Dia. 2*. White may try to get tricky with 2, but up to 9 he gets zilch.

O said that he planned to play 2 in *Dia. 3*, but Black harasses him with 3 and 5, and his result is far superior to that in the game.



Dia. 2: counterattack



Dia. 3: better for Black

Rin's 'nothing untoward' refers to the degree to which Black can harass the bottom centre white group, but White's forcing moves at 56 and 58 will prove their worth.





Figure 3 (65-100)



Dia. 4: putting pressure on White

Figure 3 (65-100). Unlike Takemiya

Kamimura: 'The 3-3 invasion of 65 is the biggest move, but switching to territory after having gone this far is not like Takemiya. I would have preferred to see him put pressure on White first with 1 in *Dia. 4*.' If Black avoids making it easy for White to make shape, he should be able to gain some kind of profit. In any case, he should get to play at 'a' first.

White gets sente. If he can secure safety for his centre group while reducing Black's thickness, he will be close to victory. O Rissei is only human: in his haste to secure eye shape, he played a little facilely with 72 and 74. Or, rather, aware he had the lead, he perhaps played too carefully, that is, he got nervous about wrapping up his win. When Black strikes the blow at 77, hope springs up.

Instead of forcing with 72 (the exchange for 73 loses points), simply taking up position with 77 would have made White thicker. As shown in *Dia. 4*, this is the vital point of the shape.

From 87 on, Black goes behind the back of the weak group — this is hardly recognizable as the cosmic Takemiya style. Some territory materializes in the centre, like a tuft of hair on the back of a horse [that is, quite small]; actually, it's one of the features of the Takemiya style that territory appears in unexpected places.

When White played 88, it was finally time for the lunch break. This speed is abnormal. Neither of these two is a slow player, but even so there seemed to be something competitive about this speed — it was a manifestation of fighting spirit.



O Rissei makes a good start to what promises to be a great series.

It looked as if Takemiya had a chance to do something, but he had more regrets about his moves.

Playing 93 by itself may be good style, but if Black is going to end up having to invest a move at 99, playing Black 94–White A–Black 93 would be more practical. Black 97 is also neither fish nor fowl: White 98 reveals its shortcomings.

Takemiya: ‘Instead of 97, I should have blocked at 98. If White B, Black C is just right to stop him coming in (if next White D, Black E is feasible).’ Black 98 would lead to a big reduction in White’s corner later.

Figure 4 (101–150). O’s shinogi to the fore

White takes sente profit with 4 and 6; he also links up his groups on the left and right at the top with 18. White’s lead is now clear.

When Black attacked at 21, there was a momentary buzz of excitement in the pressroom — ‘Something’s happened,’ someone said — but O had it all read out. Not only did he have a nice shinogi tesuji ready in White 28, he also had the well-timed hane of 30. While paying scrupulous attention to the effect on territory, he lived neatly up to White 50.

Takemiya perhaps made a slight miscalculation about White’s eye-making potential; apparently he momentarily considered resigning, but he regained his composure and played the game out.




Figure 4 (101–150)

Figure 5 (151–200), Figure 6 (201–231). *First blood to Rissei*

There's nothing particular to comment on in the endgame. While resigning himself to defeat, Takemiya played his best as mental preparation for the next game.

With Rin Kaiho and the newspaper commentator Kataoka Satoshi joining in, an enthusiastic game review followed Takemiya's resignation. Even at the wind-up party, the players discussed the game a number of times. There was none of the chagrin of the loser or the arrogance of the victor on display, nor was there any unnecessary




Figure 5 (151–200)




Figure 6 (201–231)
30: connects (above 8)

reserve — there was just the quest for the best move on the go board. Their vitality and liveliness made a refreshing sight.

White wins by 2½ points.

(*Gekkan Go Warudo*, May 2002)

Game Two: A victory for Takemiya-style thickness

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: O Rissei

Played at the Ginbaso Inn, Nishiura Hot Spring, Aichi Prefecture on 22 March 2002.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Konishi Taizo 7-dan.




Figure 1 (1–30)

Figure 1 (1–30). *O's competitive posture*

When Takemiya has black, he adopts a large-moyo strategy based on a sanrensei (three star-point stones in a row). With white, he's known for his flexible touch adapted to his opponent.

Kamimura: 'The repeated 3–3 invasions in the top and bottom left corners show that O Rissei is continuing his thoroughgoing strategy of taking a territorial lead and splitting the board up into small sectors. This could be queried as biased, but it is the manifestation of a clear-cut competitive posture, and criticizing it, let alone evaluating it as good or bad, is quite irrelevant.'

For White 22, the joseki books give White A, followed by B, but Takemiya almost always chooses 22. 'White 22 feels good — a free and easy move. To be concrete, there's a difference if White gets to block at C.' The endgame is also different: after C, White D will be sente.





Figure 2 (31-51)



Dia. 1: easy sabaki

Figure 2 (31-51). A consistent strategy

Kamimura: 'Analysing the moves is unnecessary: let's just savour them. White 32, White 34, then White 40 are magnificent. Takemiya is satisfied with his development. On the other hand, O is also playing with complete consistency, reducing early with 37, plunging in with 41.'

Black secures three corners and has a strong claim to the top right corner. With 37 and 41, he denies the opponent a large territory. It's easy to imagine that at some stage the attack and defence related to Black's stone at 37 will become the focus of the game.

Black 41 is the vital point of this shape. If White attacks with 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black easily settles his group with 2 and 4.

Black lives rapidly up to 51. His strategy may seem nasty: he takes what he wants while not giving the opponent anything, but Kamimura commented: 'Maybe so, but I'm sure Takemiya is happy with this.'

O had just completed his Kisei defence, so he was probably quite relaxed for this game.

Figure 3 (52-64). An imaginative attack

White launches his counterattack.

Kamimura: 'The forcing sequence from 52 to 58 feels good. Note that 56 is the correct way to go about it; if instead White 58, Black connects at 56, which is uninspiring for White.' If Black resists with 57 at 58, White rips off the corner with A, which is big.




Figure 3 (52-64)

59: connects

White has staked out his position and now has his gaze firmly set on his target.

Kamimura: 'Where should one commence operations? In this kind of position, to borrow the words of the late Kitani Minoru, "I wouldn't know if I thought a million years." White plays sente moves at 60 and 62, then attaches at 64: well, this feels so good I take my hat off to Takemiya. You have to admire the richness of his imagination. Putting aside any investigation of what the best move is here, I believe that in this position only Takemiya could come up with this strategy.'

This way of attacking the black stone (35) is the so-called 'leaning' strategy. The aim of forcing first with 60 and 62 is to make Black a little overconcentrated; starting a ko with White B is included in Takemiya's calculations.

A quote from Kato: 'There's no history of my fighting a ko with Takemiya and finding happiness.' What this implies is that Takemiya's true-blue style doesn't provide the opponent with many ko threats.




Figure 4 (65-80)

Figure 4 (65-80). The clash of sword on shield

Black doesn't give way: he solidifies territory up to 71, which shows fighting spirit and stubbornness. He's defying White: attack me if you dare. Soon we will hear the ring of naked steel.

Kamimura: 'Note that both White 74 in answer to Black 73 and White 82 in answer to Black 81 (Figure 5) are good moves denying the opponent eye shape.' But O Rissei is a renowned shinogi master: at some stage he will conjure up some aji (for example, by exploiting the cut of 99 in the next figure) and skilfully make shape.




Figure 5 (81-103)

Figure 5 (81-103). Looking bad for White

There are no tangible results from the attack, nor can White hope for a space that he can develop into territory. Not surprisingly, the atmosphere in the pressroom was pessimistic for White: 'He'll lose if he doesn't kill the group.'





Figure 6 (104-150)

ko: 30, 33, 36



Dia. 2: dangerous for Black

Figure 6 (104-150). Pungent play by Takemiya

With White 4, we reach the crucial scene of this game. From way back, getting a squeeze by sacrificing three stones with 4 and 6 has been a privilege guaranteed to White.

But Black tenukies and switches to 13. White naturally captures with 14. This is undreamed-of profit.

Kamimura: 'Everyone will wonder why Black



Takemiya levels the match with superb play.

doesn't capture with 1 in *Dia*. 2. This is the crucial point in the fight, so I can't draw any facile conclusions, but the continuation to 6 is one possibility. With the sente move of 'a', I guess the life of the large group is endangered. Let's trust the reading of the players.'

The attack initiated by White earlier has clearly gained him profit. And he doesn't slacken up, either. On the follow-through, he starts a ko with 22. This game bears out Takemiya's above-mentioned reputation for being strong at ko.

After going a few rounds in the ko fight, Black admits he can't win it and backs off with 37.

Much against his will, O has offered his five stones at the bottom as a sacrifice and has ceded the ko. Perhaps he calculated he could still make a game of it if he occupied the two points of 37 and 39. After all, he did start out with a large territorial lead.

Kamimura: 'The probe of 40 at this point is a jolt. If Black answers at A, White B will be sente, which would be unbearable. Fighting spirit therefore calls for Black 41, but then White 42 and 44, gouging out the side, are pungent. O was perhaps regretting that he didn't play 37 at 44, if this is what was in store for him.'

Having answered at 41, Black needs another move to secure life in the corner, so Black can't resist 42 and 44.

White's territory expands handsomely up to 50. This is a state of affairs that, as of Figure 5, no one but Takemiya could have predicted. The state of the game is now clear.

Takemiya may seem to have been rushing about furiously, like a demon or a lion, but the more closely you examine his play the more you see that it is all based on logic. The only word is 'magnificent'.

Figure 7 (151–200), Figure 8 (201–250), Figure 9 (251–300). *A triumph for the cosmic style*

The outcome of the game has already been decided, but there's a spectacular ko trade in Figure 8. However, Takemiya had it all worked out and incorporated into his calculations.

Kamimura: 'In the midst of one-minute byo-yomi, Takemiya accurately examines the ko threats and plays the best sequence. His concentration is honed to perfection.'

The real Takemiya is back. Kamimura praised him lavishly. 'This game shows that the passage of time has given him maturity with increased lethality.'




Figure 7 (151-200)




Figure 8 (201-250)

ko: 31, 34, 37; 41: connects (at 28); 42: takes (above 33); 43: cuts (above 32); 47: takes (two lines above 33); 48: connects (at 15)

The title match is now down to a best-of-three, so the fighting will probably become even sharper. It will be very interesting to see whether O Rissei continues with the consistently territorial opening strategy he has adopted or whether his renowned flexibility and openness lead him to modify it.

We may also finally see a full-fledged Takemiya moyo. A go reporter should be neutral, but

only if Takemiya really plays like Takemiya will the go world be interesting.

White wins by 8½ points.

(Gekkan Go Warudo, May 2002)




Figure 9 (251-300)

89: connects (at 62); 93: ko (at 69);

96: ko (at 84); 98: connects (at 69)

Game Three: Punishing a slack move

White: O Rissei

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played at the Kuroyon Royal Hotel in Omachi City, Nagano Prefecture on 4 April 2002.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Amatake Junji (who presents it as a first-person commentary by the pro).

Takemiya's go has a distinctive flavour in this age of players who play so as not to lose. Above all, his go has a dream: he is a valuable antidote to the miserly trend of the times. I had great expectations of this series when he became the challenger.

Figure 1 (1-23). Using the whole board

The tasuki (diagonally opposite) star-point opening of 1 and 3 is nice. In a sense, this is trying to use the go board on a larger scale than Takemiya's favourite sanrensei. Black 9 and 11 are part of a package deal. With such a wide position, Black will be happy to answer White A with B.





Figure 1 (1-28)



Dia. 1: different psychology


White 12 is the Rissei style. In contrast to Takemiya's 'wider, wider', Rissei tries to segmentalize the game. Instead of 12, extending to C would be usual, and in fact most people would compromise with this, but White wants to set up the wider extension to 14.

Well, I can hear you ask, can't Black just use 13 to extend to 1 in *Dia. 1*? If we change the order and assume that White played the marked stone at 2, then Black 1 and the marked white stone could be expected next. If so, then logically Black 1 here is conceivable. However, when White plays the marked stone first, it's psychologically hard to play Black 1. Conversely, it's quite likely that Rissei read out this psychology

when he played 12.

A moyo rapidly materializes with 15 to 23. Moreover, it is a 'diagonal territory' stretching right through the centre of the board. This powerful strategy is possible only with the tasuki star-points, which use the go board on a large scale. The reducing move of 24 comes from the world of intuition — though it does have analytical underpinnings.

For example, if White plays 'a' in *Dia. 2*, the cap of 'b' is perfect — you wouldn't have to be Takemiya to play it. White may try to be more ingenious, playing at 'c', but still he won't like Black 'd'. White 'e' looks good, but Black may play 'f'. To take a different tack, White could plunge in at 'g', whereupon Black plays 'h'. The invader may not die, but White must expect to undergo a certain amount of harassment.




Dia. 2: fuseki considerations

I would be very interested to know how Kitani Minoru would play in this position. Rissei's answer is White 24. If Black answers at D, he plans to invade at E. He believes that once White lives the 24-C exchange will be a major gain for White.

Black 25 is an attacking move that makes White's path home more distant. Mind you, Sakata Eio wouldn't play a move like this, as helping White to solidify his territory with 26 is a minus.

When Black attaches at 27, White's invasion at 28 is a probe: this technique is typical of Rissei. To me, the tenuki seems impudent, so I might hane at 1 in *Dia. 3* (next page). If White 2, one feasible strategy would be to build thickness with

Black 4, but let's assume he blocks at 3; next, he gets to block at 5, and this result seems good enough.



Dia. 3: Kamimura's counter





Figure 2 (29-50)




Dia. 4: a strong attack

Figure 2 (29-50). The losing move

Black 39. Black is faced with a perplexing decision: whether to focus on the top by blocking at A or to emphasize attack with 39. If you look at it, you find that Black 1 in Dia. 4 is quite an effective move. If White 2, Black can cut at 3; if White 4, Black 5 to 11 follow, making miai of 'a'

and 'b'. Yet if White tries a makeshift move like 4 at 'c' (Black plays 'd'), Black 'e' will be a severe move.

That's not to say that Black 39 is a bad move. The problem comes immediately after this. When White plays 40, Black emphasizes attack with 41. But what on earth is Takemiya doing with 43?



Dia. 5: the key point

Dia. 5. Black 1 is a very important vital point. When White plays 2, Black can go back and play 3: Black can still aim at attacking White, so this is far superior to the game. *Go Weekly* gave the variation White 2 at 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd'—White 2, but this feels as if White is thrashing around to little purpose.

Because Black simply cuts at 43, White makes good, flexible shape with 46 and 48, so Black can no longer hope to make an effective attack on this group. Difficult positions continue to appear after this, but I believe that this one move of 43 ruined Black's game.

White 50 is solid. If this is the exchange for 47, then Black is probably grateful. White 50 at B would be the usual move — was Rissei worried about Black C? Next, White D, Black E, and White makes good shape with the hane of F, so this looks feasible for White.

Figure 4 (51-75). Cool play by Rissei

When White hanes at 52, Black has no move that makes good shape. He's fallen behind in territory and has no severe attack in prospect. Black 53 is an all-out do-or-die move.

However, at this point Rissei displays coolness under pressure. White 54 is solid; instead of this move, the hane of White 55, followed by

Black 61 and White A, would be natural, but Rissei is taking the view that his position will be adequate so long as his left-side group doesn't get into bad trouble.





Figure 3 (51-75)



Dia. 6: good for White

Black 53 and 55 are an attempt to intimidate: 'I'll cut at 61 next!' But White responds calmly, capturing a stone with 58 and 60, then attaching at 62.


The way White carefully secured life with 68 on also aroused my admiration. He's saying: even if by any chance the centre two white stones are captured, my left-side group will never die.

Black 73 is preparation for a new round. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 6*, we can assume White will play first in the upper right with 2, and it's unlikely that Black can win. White will lay waste

to his territory up to 8, then in the centre that Black's relying on he has to worry about White 'a'. If Black 3 at 'b', White plays 'c'—Black 'd'—White 'e': it's inconceivable that he will have any trouble saving his group.

Up until this point, Rissei has been playing very calmly, but the instant he sees Black 73 he sets his two stones in motion with 74. This is magnificent. I like it. If Black extends at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White probably intends to cut with 2 to 6. White 'a' and 'b' are miai.

Black 75 aims at attacking the centre stones: this is the final showdown.



Dia. 7: unreasonable for Black



O Rissei — in a tough spot, he can rely on his shinogi




Figure 4 (76-100)


completely read out.

White 76 is a contact play he's been aiming at; it's a blow at the vital point. After the forcing moves to 80, he attaches at 82, another clever contact play. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 8*, he's ready with the crosscut of 2; if 3, White induces 5 and 7, then thumps him with 8. Instead of 3 —


Dia. 9. If Black 3 here, White breaks through with 4 and 6, which is no good for Black.

The long and the short of it is that various sente moves have been created in the centre, so Black is helpless to resist.


Black has no choice but to play 83, whereupon White has no regrets about forcing with 84 and 88 [though 85 and 89 damage his centre top position]; he then extends at 92, and Black can't rescue his three stones. If Black plays 93 at 94, White is ready with 2 in *Dia. 10*; after 3 to 6, Black can't save both groups.




Dia. 8: falling into a trap



Dia. 10: no good for Black



Dia. 9: doesn't work either



Dia. 11: good for White

Figure 4 (76-100). Two clever contact plays

The three centre white stones may look a little forlorn, but Rissei has his shinogi sequences

If Black does want to go all-out to save all his stones, Black 1 in *Dia. 11* is the move, but White will first break through on the right with 4 to 8, then switch back to 10. I can't see this group being captured.

In desperation, Black switches to 93, but when White secures his capture with 94 and 96, the game is over. White has read out the shinogi for his left-side group ages ago.




Figure 6 (101-150)




Figure 7 (151-200)
53: connects (left of 47)

Figure 6 (101-150). The shinogi master

The contact play of 1 may give the spectator a momentary jolt, but the overall position is decided when White takes a grip on a black stone

with 6. I hear that Takemiya commented: 'A diagonal move at A would have been better than 1,' but that would not have affected the result.

Figure 7 (151-200). The difficulties of a centre strategy

Takemiya just crumbled in this game. A centre-oriented style like his carries with it many risks. One small slip may be fatal. [When Takemiya was at his peak, as Honinbo, Otake Hideo often used to comment on how difficult it was to win with a centre game and that this was all the more reason to admire Takemiya.] He seemed to be going well until part way, but that one mistake with 43 was fatal.

[As a fellow Kitani disciple, Kamimura mainly takes Takemiya's side, but, it seems to me (the translator), his commentary clearly shows that O Rissei played a superb game. His reading was spot on and enabled him to make a ruin of his opponent's moyo ambitions.]

Black resigns after White 200.

(Gekkan Go Warudo, June 2002)

O Rissei's titles

In the list of top title-winners in Japan, O surpassed Takagawa when he defended the Kisei title earlier this year. That gave him his 19th title and put him alone in 11th place. To make the top ten, his target is to overhaul Fujisawa Shuko's tally of 23 titles.

Game Four

A come-from-behind win

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: O Rissei

Played at the Hoson Hotel in Dogo Hot Spring, Ehime Prefecture on 18 April 2002.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Amatake Junji.

With a history of 3,000 years, Dogo is the oldest hot spring resort in Japan. It's also known as a favourite of such literary figures as the poet Masaoka Shiki and the novelist Natsume Soseki [who is on the 1,000 yen banknote]. From the playing room on the 8th floor, Matsuyama Castle is visible in the distance.





Figure 1 (1-36)



Dia. 1: the way ordinary mortals would play

Figure 1 (1-36). A bold sacrifice strategy

Facing 3-4 points [1 and 3: *mukai-komoku*] are unusual for O. Takemiya likewise chooses unfamiliar moves for him in the small knight of 6 and the contact play of 10, but that doesn't last long: he quickly reverts to type.

Pressing at 14 is natural if you're Takemiya. Using 22 to capture a stone with A would also be good, but it takes more than 22 to surprise us. What surprised the players in the pressroom, like Otake Hideo 9-dan and Ko Mosei 8-dan, was Takemiya's strategy in giving way with 28, inviting the cut of Black 29 and 31, and sacrificing five stones. This is a bold conception.

An ordinary player would consider only

White 1 in *Dia. 1* for 28. White answers 2 etc. by squeezing, then bolts the door shut with 11. Takemiya prefers to discard five stones and play 34 in sente, as he is attracted by the prospect of playing first at the bottom with 36. Walling off the outside is his forte.

However, Black had a counter available: playing 35 at B would apparently have been a good move. White is left with the option of resurrecting his group with C-Black D-White E, but pressing at F and pulling out his stone with G are miai for Black, so finding his next move is not easy for White. The above was Ko Mosei's theory; O is said to have agreed with him later.






Figure 2 (37-65)



Dia. 2: better for Black?



Dia. 3: White focusses on the centre

Figure 2 (37-65). Grateful for profit

Takemiya's resolute strategy did not meet with approval. Not only is Black's 20+ points of profit big, but also Black A will be severe if the

ladder turns good for Black. I heard that in Tokyo some players were saying they definitely wouldn't want to be White in this position.

Black 37 is a good move in itself and is a ladder block. In response, White 38 is the only move. In the pressroom no one queried this exchange, but O later let slip a regret that he hadn't played 37 on the fifth line at 1 in *Dia. 2*. White would now be reluctant to cap at 'a'.

However, O is fond of actual profit and his reaction to the result in the top left corner was probably: 'Thanks for a delicious meal.' When he secured life, small though it was, at the bottom, he doubtless believed he was ahead.

White 64 is the kind of thick move Takemiya likes, but switching to 1 in *Dia. 3* would have been better. If 2, White attaches at 3, and the centre becomes whitish.




Figure 3 (66-109)

Figure 3 (66-109). A confidently played shoulder hit

Black is doing well when he gets to play 75: that's what everyone following the game thought. But White confidently plays the shoulder hit of 76. Up to 82, he splits Black into two, and now you feel like backing White. The moment he saw the shoulder hit, Ko Mosei praised it lavishly: 'Superb!' In retrospect, Black should have played 75 at 88.


With Black having unsettled groups on the right side and in the bottom right corner, the initiative is gradually being assumed by White. The players in the pressroom, who just a little while

ago had agreed that Black was doing better, felt as if they had been bewitched by a fox.

Black 85 is perhaps dubious. The exchange for White 86 hurts Black's own corner, on top of which he can't omit the vital point of 87, as he can't let White play there. Ko: 'Instead of 85, Black should have jumped to 1 in *Dia. 4*.' Black will actually be grateful if White attaches at 2, as this leaves him with a hane at 'a' or 'b'. Keeping this in the back of his mind, Black could dance out at 3 and fight.

When he played 87, O gave a wry chuckle. He would like to be able to play the 1-3 combination in *Dia. 5*, but the exchange for 4 has an effect on his bottom right corner group. Black 87 is patient but painful.

White builds a solid position with 88 and 90 and waits for a chance to attack.




Dia. 4: better for Black *Dia. 5: bad for Black*

Black 97 is a move that Black has taken pains over. If instead he settles the corner with 1 in *Dia. 6* (next page), White will strike with the peep of 2. If Black connects at 4, the deadly wedge of White 'a' will put him on the spot. Even if he tries the variation of 3 here, White 4 to 8 make miai of the cuts at 'b' and 'c'.


That's why O felt himself compelled to force with 97 before looking after the corner with 101. As you can see, White's thickness is a silent but menacing presence.

Black has no choice but to give way in the face of White 102. White then plays 106 and 108 as insurance against Black A.

I don't think anyone would be able to guess Takemiya's next move.



Dia. 6: trouble for Black



Dia. 8: White wraps it up





Figure 4 (110-148)



Dia. 7: disaster

Figure 4 (110-148). Byo-yomi brilliance

Takemiya went into byo-yomi on White 84 in the previous figure. Against O, with his outstanding reading ability, this made things quite hard for him. However, the more the time pressure increased, the better his play became.

The solid *pintsugi* connection of 10 is incredible. Wedging in immediately with White 36—Black 42—White A looks possible, but, according to Ko, ‘Takemiya is aiming at the whole group, not just the tail.’ When Otake saw 10, he said over and over: ‘Magnificent!’ Sooner or later, this barricade that White has invested so many moves in building will unleash an awesome power.

Connecting at 14 is another thick move, though at first sight it might seem uninspired. What’s wrong with extending at B? The reason becomes clear later, long after White plays the two-step hane of 16 and 18 and raps Black on the head with 20 . . . There was a move that only Takemiya saw.

In response to Black 23, a move that pays due respect to White’s thickness, White 24 is a light jab. When Black fights hard with 33 and 35, White explodes with the punch of 36. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 7, White cuts with 2 and 4. Black has no choice about answering with 39, but when White hounds him with 42 to 46 Black is on the point of surrendering.

White 48. Ko: ‘The game would have been over if White had played 1 and 3 in Dia. 8.’ If next Black ‘a’, White ‘b’ — Black can’t get two eyes. Even though he sacrifices the four stones left of centre, White will obviously win if he captures the black group on the side.

Figure 5 (149-170). Good for Black?

However, Black lives proudly up to 69. Moreover, with Black A—White B—Black C at his disposal, the right-side black group is almost alive. There was a stir in the pressroom: ‘Black has done well. It’s an upset’; ‘A minute a move is too tough, after all. Guess O’s defended his title.’

But, despite the pressure of having the seconds read out, White lets fly with the placement

at 70. Relying on the thickness of his two-stone capture at 66, Takemiya has been aiming at this move.




Figure 5 (149-170)





Figure 6 (171-201)
ko: 94, 97, 100



Dia. 9: White's chance to decide the game

Figure 6 (171-201). White rejects the reprieve.

O became immobile when he saw the placement. Even the far-seeing O had probably overlooked this move. Eventually he played 71 and 73 — at this moment, he must have resigned himself to defeat.

However, White plays in the wrong direction with 74. If he had continued with 1 in *Dia. 9*, the outcome would have been decided. If Black answers 1 with 6, White 2 knocks him out; Black 2 here gives a ko, but the position is hopeless if White can get a ko in a place like this.

Takemiya: 'I played White 74 because I thought it was sente.' But the right-side black group won't die easily.

O needs no second invitation to add a reinforcement. Black plays 75 and should breathe a sigh of relief, but . . . this is the losing move. Instead, reinforcing at 82 was correct. Because he played 75, White 84 and 92 become sente, making a difference of five points.

This kind of complicated fighting position is usually O's forte. What's more, he had plenty of time left, so for him to make a mistake . . .

The contact play of 86 is the finishing touch. There's a ko involved, but basically this reduces Black's territory to three points and decides White's win.




Figure 7 (202-250)
ko: 36, 39, 42, 45, 48

Figure 7 (202-250), Figure 8 (251-311)

The game ended at 11:02 p.m. It was a game that Takemiya fought with all his strength, play-



Once again, White wins, so Takemiya levels the series.

ing over 200 moves or five hours in byo-yomi.

White wins by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points.

(Gekkan Go Warudo, June 2002)

Game Five: Whole-board vision

White: O Rissei

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played at Ikaho Hot Spring, Gunma Prefecture on 25 April 2002. Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Sekine Shingo.




Figure 8 (251–311)

54: ko; 57: ko; 74: connects (at 71);

111 connects (below 75)




Figure 1 (1–46)


Figure 1 (1–46). Reducing prematurely

The fifth game is another hard-fought one, with many highlights. It's a fitting finale to the series. The opening follows the pattern already established. Takemiya goes his own way, playing in the grand manner (especially so with 19). Rissei, as always, aims at splitting up the board; his strategy is to deny Takemiya the space for his cosmic style to come into play by dragging him into messy and confused infighting. For example, following Black 29, the usual strategy would be to occupy the large point of A; Black then plays 39 and White plays B (of course, this is a pattern Takemiya has been playing for decades). Instead, Rissei attaches violently at 30, but you can see that this is a predetermined strategy.

However, what are we to make of this? Surely it's premature. The whole point of territory-reducing or -destroying moves is that they are most effective played one move before the opponent completes his territory.

The openings that Rissei played in the first four games were all justifiable as 'strategies' and so not appropriate for evaluating as good or bad, but in this case I believe his opening is problematic.

Up to 46, White gets a comfortable position on the right side, but in the meantime he's been left with the burden of the 1–3 ko at the top right in *Dia. 1*. Black has also increased his territory through the two captures he's made on the right side, so you don't get the impression that White is winning on territory. His opening strategy has been a failure.



Dia. 1: a burden on White

Figure 2 (47–65). Cleverly creating aji

White's erratic play continues. White 48 should be at 54. The centre right white group is not yet completely secure, which is all the more reason White should defend solidly in this corner.

Black 49 is a perfect splitting move. Black is doing well.

White 50. Something's strange: White is playing from the more narrow side. Usually you

make a checking extension from the wider side, as in *Dia. 2*. The moves to 5 follow, but Black immediately invades at 6, and White can't handle this fight. The fact that he can't play the usual move shows that White is in a painful position.






Figure 2 (47–65)



Dia. 2: usual, but . . .



Dia. 3: submissive, but . . .

However, I was impressed by Rissei's manoeuvring from this point on. His play after the cut of 62 is magnificent.

Does it look as if White is cutting Black in a place where he's as solid as a rock? Does White seem to be in trouble?

Yes, it's certainly true that White can't immediately do anything with his two stones when Black plays the knight's move of 65. However, I think that instead of attacking all out like this, Black could have just defended at 1 in *Dia. 3*

(reluctant though he might be to play it, as it's painfully submissive). Black makes the solid diagonal move of 3, then, if White 4, can settle his stones with 5.




Figure 3 (66-103)

Figure 3 (66-103). *The position fluctuates.*


The reason I made the comment about 65 in the previous figure is because White gets to play the skilful aji-creating moves of 66 and 68. To begin with, he's aiming at the White A-Black B-White C combination seen later in the game.

Then there's White 70. While threatening Black on the left, he's also glaring sideways at the nastiness of White 91. Black has no way of eliminating with one move the threats above and below.


This really filled me with admiration. The way O created this exquisitely nasty aji here reminds me of Kitani Minoru at his peak. O takes his place among the great warriors of go. I've known him since he was young, and I venture to say that he's got stronger.

I wouldn't be surprised if Takemiya was somewhat bemused by the game at this point. The flow of the game looks good for Black, but deciding on his moves is surprisingly difficult.

White 76 and 78 emphasize the threat of White 91. It's getting more and more difficult for Black to know what to do. Going by shape, the right move is Black 1 in *Dia. 4*, but turning at White 2 is severe. If Black 5, White uses the cut of 6 to seal Black in. Huddling up on the inside like this (especially for Takemiya) is considered quite hopeless.



Dia. 4: shape, but...




Dia. 5: best

The conclusion is that the best Black can do is to use 79 to fix up his shape as in *Dia. 5*. Attacking with 79 in the game just has the contrary effect of making White stronger and eliminating his anxieties. I can't see the point of Black's play.

White 90. If White forced with 4 etc. in *Dia. 5*, he would get sente; he could then switch to D in the figure, making the game resignable for Black. Perhaps because the turn in his favour had been so sudden, Rissei played slackly.

Takemiya now takes advantage of this one slack move to exert his power. Black 93 is a troublesome move. White has no choice but to answer 95 patiently with 96; if instead he plays 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black cuts at 2. White can't handle this fight, as he has to worry about the threat of Black's engineering a large-scale double attack with 'a'.

However, White has his eye shape stolen with Black 97 on. Black's territorial gain is also big. Takemiya probably got his fighting dander up again.



Dia. 6: ominous for White

Figure 4 (104-154). *O takes the lead.*

The game is very close as it enters the end-game.

Considering how close it is, Black has to use a little more ingenuity over 11. I believe the game wouldn't have been bad for him if he'd followed *Dia. 7*.

Rissei's play is more ingenious. He uses 14 to live in sente, then he slips in a connection at the top with 18 on (if Black had played 27 first, this wouldn't be possible). At this point, White takes a slight lead.




Figure 4 (104-154)







Figure 5 (155-200)



Dia. 7: a win for Black?

White 46, eliminating the cut of Black A, is big. He follows this up with more shrewd moves, forcing with 50 and 52, then descending at 54.





Takemiya played an excellent match but fell a fraction short at the end.




Figure 7 (251-309)

75: connects (at 68); 79: connects (above 77)
ko (over 80): 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101;
103: connects (at 96); 104: ko; 107: ko;
109: connects

Go World news

Continued from page 8

News from Korea

First Western professionals in Korea

Until recently, Western players with professional aspirations came to Japan. Five players have qualified as professionals in Japan (at the Kansai Ki-in, the late Manfred Wimmer 2-dan; at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo, James Kerwin 1-dan,

Michael Redmond 9-dan, and Hans Pietsch 4-dan; and, at the Nihon Ki-in in Nagoya, Catalin Taranu 5-dan).

This summer saw the debut of the first Western professionals at the Hanguk Kiwon in Seoul: Alexandr Dinerchtein and Svetlana Shikshina. They both came to Korea from Russia to study go in 1997.

Yi Ch'ang-ho defends Wangwi title

Soon after their clash in the Fujitsu Cup, the two Yis met again to finish off the 36th Wangwi title match. Things again looked bad for the older Yi when Se-tol won the fourth game and tied the series, but Ch'ang-ho came good in the fifth game. That gave him his seventh successive victory in this title.

The results:

Game 1 (12 July). Se-tol (B) by resig.
Game 2 (19 July). Ch'ang-ho (B) by resig.
Game 3 (26 July). Ch'ang-ho (W) by resig.
Game 4 (6 August). Se-tol (W) by 2½.
Game 5 (13 August). Ch'ang-ho (W) by 3½.

Yi Ch'ang-ho defends 33rd Myeong-in title

On 6 August, An Cho-yeong 7-dan (W) beat Yu Ch'ang-hyeok by half a point to score his sixth win in a row in the Myeong-in league. His nearest rival, Yi Se-tol 3-dan, had suffered his second loss on 31 July, so An became the challenger.

The title holder was Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan, whose record against An was an unblemished 8-0. An was not able to turn the tide, though he did manage to pick up his first win ever against Yi in the third game. The latter overcame this temporary setback and clinched the series in the fourth game. He has now won this title ten years in a row.

The results:

Game 1 (9 Sept.). Yi (B) by resig.
Game 2 (17 Sept.). Yi (W) by resig.
Game 3 (24 Sept.). An (W) by ½.
Game 4 (2 Oct.). Yi (W) by resig.

8th Women's Kuksu Cup

So far, one game has been played in this best-of-three. The title-hyolder, Rui Naiwei (B), defeated the challenger, Cho Hye-yeon, by resignation on 18 October.

News from China on page 74

The 57th Honinbo Title Match: O Meien vs. Kato

Game One: A hectic start

Recently the veterans of the Japanese go scene, especially from the Kitani school, have been making a bit of a comeback. Last year, Rin Kaiho challenged for the Meijin title at the age of 59; the 50-year-old Kobayashi Koichi is hanging on to the Gosei title; at 51, Takemiya made a spirited challenge for the Judan title; and the 46-year-old Cho Chikun won the Meijin league. However, the most impressive performance has been that of the 55-year-old Kato Masao, who has resurrected himself as Honinbo after a gap of 22 years.

Kato's opponent was O Meien, who had already achieved the target of proving he was not a flash in the pan by defending the Honinbo title last year. This success seemed to give him new confidence in his bold and imaginative opening strategy, and he has developed into one of the most entertaining players on the go scene. At the age of 41, he seemed to be in his prime. Kato had a lead over O of 13-5 in previous encounters, but most of these wins came early in O's career, and, to be frank, most pundits thought that the odds were against Kato.

As it turned out, the series was a fascinating one, so we are going to present all the games in this issue. Be advised, however, that the commentary on the first game is long and complex.



Tohi is the birthplace of Honinbo Shuwa (1820-73). O and Kato visit a memorial to him the day before the first game.

White: O Meien Honinbo

Black: Kato Masao 9-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 8 hours each.

Played in the town of Tohi, Shizuoka Prefecture on 13 & 14 May 2002. *Commentary by Akiyama Jiro 7-dan. Report by Yoshida Naoki.*





Figure 1 (1-16)



Dia. 1: a conventional strategy

Figure 1 (1-16). O's imaginative opening

The tasuki pattern of 1 to 4 usually leads to a fighting game. White 10 was well received as an imaginative move typical of O. Mizokami Tomochika 7-dan, the Mainichi newspaper commentator, said: 'It was worth coming to Tohi just to see this move.'

Akiyama: 'The development in *Dia. 1* is quite conceivable. However, White 10 keeps its distance from the opponent. Also, you often see O play the large-knight move.'

After both sides occupy large points, White 14 is another interesting move. This may look like an ordinary one-space jump, but from a distance it is glaring at Black 9. O is using the whole board.






Figure 2 (17-33)



Dia. 2: Black is too thin



Dia. 3: White is satisfied


Figure 2 (17-33). Black takes the initiative.

Black 17. Black could also invade at 18. The continuation to 10 in *Dia. 2* is a one-way street. This result is quite dubious for Black, as his bottom left corner enclosure becomes too thin. Sakata Eio (the game referee): 'This is no good: Black's gone too much for territory.' Akiyama: 'The corner enclosure is not attractive, so I wouldn't be too enthusiastic about this. I'd prefer to do what Black does in the game: jump to 17 and secure territory in the process of attacking the white pincer.'

White 18. White plays conservatively because when Black gets a stone at A, Black B will become a threat. Akiyama: 'Compared to White C, this exerts less influence on the two black stones, but it gives White greater flexibility. In this position, I, too, would choose the 3-3 move.'

Take note of Black 21. Black 19 applies pressure to the marked stone (White 16). That being so, how about playing as in *Dia. 3*?

Akiyama: 'The moves to 4 can be expected. However, White is not dissatisfied, as he's cut off the marked stone. So I wonder if Black shouldn't have used 19 to jump to 30.'



Dia. 4: better for White

With 21 to 23, both sides move out a step at a time into the centre. But Akiyama frowned when White played 24. Why didn't he follow *Dia. 4*? Akiyama: 'I think White 24 is the cause of White's falling behind in the opening. Black gets to fix up his shape with 25 and 27, and the end result is that he is allowed to occupy the superb point of 33.'

Both sides can develop into the centre with a knight's move by playing at 33, so it is the crucial point of the opening; playing here is essential for both sides.

In spite of this, O spins sideways with 30 and 32. After the game, he said: 'I didn't like the prospect of Black's being left with the vital point of D.'

The initiative has switched to Black.

Figure 2 (34-69). Black continues to do well.

With 35, it's Kato's turn to express regrets. He said he should have made the checking exten-

sion of 1 in *Dia. 5*. The moves to 9 might follow. The difference from the game is that Black gets a much grander position in the top right. Akiyama: 'In the game, the bottom left corner is not yet secure territory, as White still has the aji of A or 68. Following *Dia. 5* would have been simpler for Black.'





Figure 3 (34-69)



Dia. 5: Black simplifies

The players occupy the last remaining large points with 37 and 42, and the framework of the game is gradually decided.

Black forces with 43 to 49, then switches to 51 and 53. For the player in the lead, the best shortcut to victory is 'to make the board narrow', that is, to simplify; it looks as if Black is already trying to shut up shop. In fact, most of the players in the pressroom favoured Black's chances.


The top right black moyo swells up after Black 57. White 58 is the sealed move, ending the first day's play. O had used four hours 25 minutes to Kato's two hours 25 minutes. Aki-

yama: 'At this point, I'd prefer to hold black. I think that White 24 in Figure 2 was, after all, dubious.'

The next day, when the players replayed the first day's moves, O seemed to be frowning at some of his moves. He also forgot a move, something you don't often see in title matches, and the game recorder had to help him out.

Obviously White will lose if Black converts his moyo into territory as it is. White has to drop a bomb. Before we look at his invasion, let's record an interesting comment by Akiyama. 'For me, White 56 is the most memorable move of this game. A player like me would be tempted to do something inside the black moyo before he encloses with 57, but O plays a waiting move with 56. I feel that this is a thick move. I wouldn't have the nerve to play it myself.'

The other side of the coin from thickness is slackness. It's surprising how many of these 'thick' moves you find in the games of the great players of the past. When they are played, they look slack, but as the game progresses their influence gradually comes to affect more and more of the board. These days speed has come to be more and more prized, so moves that try to dominate the whole board are rare.



Dia. 6: complications

White plunges into the moyo with the strongest move, 60; a ko fight seems inevitable. White plays at 66 to create ko threats, but Black answers calmly at 67, then captures at 69, avoiding a ko. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 6*, White starts the ko, then uses 4 as a ko threat. Black prefers to keep the game simple; he is still doing well.





Figure 4 (70-107)



Dia. 7: Black's costly mistake

Figure 4 (70-107). The game is thrown into confusion.

Breaking into the bottom left black territory is White's only compensation for his loss in the top right, but, as mentioned earlier, White had *aji* here [see the comment for Black 35], so it's not likely it would all have become black territory anyway. In short, White is going to have to put a lot of pressure on the centre bottom black group to have a chance of winning.


At this point, however, perhaps because of his consciousness of having the lead, Kato makes a painful mistake: Black 73. Akiyama explains what's wrong with it. 'Black should first make the 1-2 and 3-4 exchanges in *Dia. 7* before descending at 5. If White leaves things as they are, the wedge of Black 'a' will be painful, so White will play 6. Black answers at 7 and has enough space to live. White can't press him any further. This diagram represents the safest way for Black to maintain his lead.'

Because Black missed *Dia. 7*, White strikes with 74 and 76: at one blow, Black's eye space has been reduced. And, ultimately, White rips off


two stones with 96.

Akiyama: 'With this, Black has coughed up all his opening profit. The two-stone capture is much bigger than it looks, when you take into consideration Black's potential for attacking the whole white group.'

Actually, even now Black could have avoided losing the two stones. In the game review, the first thing Kato did was to express regrets about Black 87 and 89. Akiyama: 'If White doesn't get a stone at 90 [that is, if Black doesn't make the 87-90 exchanges], Black can probably save his stones with 1 in *Dia. 8*. The continuation is quite difficult, but, if White wants to capture Black, he has to play at 2. Later on, Black cuts by sheer brute force with 11 and 13, and a capturing race begins. The continuation is another long sequence: to 37 in *Dia. 9*. The position is subtle, but Black seems to have the edge in the capturing race. My guess is that it was this variation Kato regretted missing. Even so, this is a perilous fight, so *Dia. 7* is safer for Black.'




Dia. 8: saving his two stones



Dia. 9: Black has the edge

The position has changed from good for Black to 'probably good' for White. But now it's White's turn to go wrong. White 102 is in completely the wrong direction. 'This was awful,' exclaimed O after the game. Extending solidly at 1 in *Dia. 10* was the only move.



Dia. 10: the only move

Akiyama: 'Peeping once at 100 is OK, but I can't understand why White didn't extend at 1 in *Dia. 10*. The best Black can do is to defend at 2; playing 3 now is the correct timing.'

Although White gains territory with 102 and 106, Black's swallowing up his single centre stone with 105 and 107 is a big loss. Akiyama: 'If you compare this development with *Dia. 10*, you can see how big the difference is. In the diagram, it would have been very hard for Black to recover and get back into the game.'

The game is back to even. It is now approaching a climax.





Figure 5 (108-141)

Figure 5 (108-141). When the dust clears White is ahead.

The biggest task remaining is deciding how to tackle the white group on the right side. Akiyama: 'Black 17 is the move with the most complications. In response, White could use 18 to compromise with 1 in *Dia. 11*. However, the way his territory is reduced up to 5 is painful, and O


probably concluded that he couldn't play like this. That's why he resisted with 18.'




Dia. 11: painful for White

The variations from White 18 had been examined in detail in the pressroom, but the conclusion was that it was unreasonable for White. This fight is the climax of the game.

Akiyama: 'Once White commits himself to 18, the continuation to 32 is forced. However, I should explain about White 26: White 1 in *Dia. 12* is unreasonable, as White's pivotal stones are cut off after 10.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

'Black 33 is dubious: Black 1 in *Dia. 13* is simpler. The moves to 6 are forced. Black then plays 7, but the burden is bigger on White than on Black, so he can't contest the ko. Therefore, with tears in his eyes, he has to compromise with 8. In that case, the moves to 16 follow. Black sacrifices his nine stones in a successful squeeze strategy. This diagram would put Black clearly ahead. On top of this, Black 35 at A would lead to an ultra-difficult ko fight. *Dia. 13* leaves no scope for complications.'

Having missed the decisive blow, little by little Kato starts to play erratically. That shows how difficult this fight is. Kato had started the fight and induced O Meien to play a do-or-die move, creating chances for Kato — so far so good, but . . .





Figure 6 (142-170)
45, 48: ko; 57: connects (at 52)



Dia. 14: good for White

Figure 6 (142-170). Not enough compensation

The next to seize an opportunity from amidst the chaos of the game is O Honinbo. First, a comment from Akiyama. 'Instead of 52, White should peep at 1 in *Dia. 14*, making the exchange for 2, then jump to 3. This probably gives White the lead.'

If you compare the 52-58 sequence in the game to *Dia. 14*, the decisive difference is the presence or absence of eye shape for the white group at the bottom. In *Dia. 14*, though just barely, White has two eyes in the centre. We don't have space to show the variations, but we hope you'll take Akiyama's word for this.


Akiyama: 'White gets two eyes just by the

skin of his teeth. Actually, it's an extremely delicate question whether the peep of White 1 in *Dia. 14* will be sente. If I were to give each variation, 100 diagrams wouldn't come near to covering them. My conclusion from my own research is that *Dia. 14* is valid.'

In short, the sequence from White 52 to 58 was dubious. At the risk of repetition, we can say that White 1 in *Dia. 14* was best.

We finally approach the actual climax now: Black 59. This is the move Kato expressed most regret over in the game review.

Akiyama: 'Black should first have taken the ko with 1 in *Dia. 15*. If 2, the moves to 13 follow. Black 'a' and 'b' are miai, so White is helpless.'



Dia. 15: Kato's last chance
8: connects

White wants to reinforce in the centre even if he has to invest a move on it. And here Black 59 goes and 'forces' (= helps) him to link up with 60. Black no longer has any chance of winning.

Black captures the white stones in the centre in return for the ko, but his *mochikomi* (loss without compensation) on the right side is too big. His gain is too slight.

Akiyama: 'Even now the game is still close, but, slight though the margin is, there's no way it can turn in Black's favour. I studied the subsequent endgame, but Black doesn't seem to have had any chances.'

Figure 7 (171-200). A joint oversight

'Right here there's a point where White could have had a severe jolt: Black 71. If Black uses this move to push through at A, Black B and Black 76 become miai, so White collapses.'

Actually, neither player noticed this move. It was pointed out after the game by Awaji Shuzo 9-dan, and O's mouth gaped open in astonishment. It would have been excruciating to lose the game like this.




Figure 7 (171–200)




Figure 8 (206–246)

23: connects (below 5);

40: connects (at 37); 46: connects (at 31)

Figure 7, Figure 8. Countable but not close

The game ended up being countable, but it was full of furious, confused fighting, a fitting start to a series between two warriors of the go board. Though he's a veteran of countless title matches, Kato shows no decline in his powers. His opponent, O Meien, has been praised by Sakata Eio, 23rd Honinbo, as having got stronger since he won the title.

The fighting can only get more heated.

White wins by 1½ points.
(Gekkan Go Warudo, July 2002)

Game Two: Destroying the enemy's central citadel

White: Kato Masao

Black: O Meien

Played at the Clayton Bay Hotel, Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture on 24 & 25 May 2002.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Taniguchi Makio.




Figure 1 (1–36)


Figure 1 (1–36). Kato doesn't disappoint his fans.

O's strategy is to make early approach moves at 3 and 5. Kamimura: 'It used to be said that approach moves to star-point stones were not urgent, but the way of thinking about go has become broader.'

Black takes the bottom left corner up to 13, then plays first in the upper left with 15. Kamimura: 'Black is developing quickly. Rather than taking territory, I'd say he's destroying the space White should take.' Still, White is thick.


Black takes the bottom right corner, too. White 26 and 28 are good points. If Black uses 31 to enclose the top left corner, White will make the shoulder hit at A, which Black doesn't want.

White's approach move at 32 triggers some interesting manoeuvring. First, the pincer of 35 — if at 1 in *Dia. 1* (next page), White 2 will be perfect.



Dia. 1: good for White

Kamimura looked happy when he saw White 36. 'You can rely on Kato,' he said. The background giving birth to this move is shown in *Dia. 2*. If White attaches at 1, the joseki continues up to 12. But the high pincer (the marked stone) is shining. White can't permit this, so he rebels. White 36 launches a violent variation.



Dia. 2: perfect for Black





Figure 2 (37-63)

Figure 2 (37-63). *Good for White, but —*


The marked stone was the catalyst for violent change on the board. Kamimura praised it highly, but probably everyone who saw it found it a refreshing sight.

Black has no choice about answering with a hane on top. If he plays underneath with 1 in *Dia.*


3, White hanes at 2; even if Black cuts at 3, he has trouble coping. White follows up with 6 and 8; if Black connects, White ataries at 'a' — not, of course, a good result for Black.



Dia. 3: too good for White



Dia. 4: variation



Dia. 5: better for White

Black 39 is a direct, plain move. White exchanges 40 for 41, after which the continuation to 61 is a one-way street. Kamimura: 'At a glance, the scope for variation seems surprisingly small. And the result is good for White.'

Kamimura wondered if Black could have played 39 at 1 in *Dia. 4*. If White 2, the moves to 11 follow.

How about playing a two-step hane instead of Black 41, that is, 1 in *Dia. 5*? White counters Black 3 with the sente move of 4. After Black connects at 11, extending at 12 is the key point. Defending with 13 is necessary, so White occupies the good point of 14. Black is left with defects in his wall.

Connecting at Black 61 is essential. The fight comes to a pause with White 62. In the newspaper report on the game, O admitted that this result was bad for Black.

The only thing is that Black has built a wall of steel. With this thickness to back him up, the invasion of 63 is severe.





Figure 3 (64-75)

Figure 3 (64-75). The central citadel falls.

A little earlier, the marked stone would have felt like a reducing move, aimed at laying waste to territory. Now, however, with the backing of Black's impressive thickness at the top, it feels to some extent like an attack on White.

White 64 is the kind of move you play to attack a reducing move; in this respect, White has been caught off guard.




Dia. 6: easier for White

Black needs no second invitation to strike with 65 and 67, with, of course, the crosscut next to come. You can almost hear the sound of White's main citadel collapsing into rubble.

Kato expressed regrets about White 64. 'I should have descended at 1 in Dia. 6.' Kamimura

agreed. If Black 2, White then plays 3. Using 2 to jump to 'a' would be uninspired: White 'b' takes all the pressure off White.

Kamimura frowned on seeing White 68. This is a decisive point of the game. 'I'd like to know how much time Kato spent on this move.' Because the cut of 69 must come.




Dia. 7: better for White?

Kamimura wanted to use 68 to hane at 1 in Dia. 7. If Black 2, the moves to 7 follow. Black 8 aims at the atari of 'a', and White 9 is the strongest resistance. After 13, Black has no way of capturing the two white stones; Black 'b' will be sente, but White handles that with 'c'. How can Black get a decent result out of this? Kamimura: 'Wouldn't this fight be feasible for White?'

The White 70-72 combination is an emergency measure. White 72 at 1 in Dia. 8 gives a hopeless result.

In the figure, too, where Black captures a stone, White has been put through the wringer. He's thin all over the place.



Dia. 8: hopeless for White





Figure 4 (76-100)



Dia. 9: disastrous


Figure 4 (76-100). *O a clever competitor*

White's position is almost beyond repair. Black 77 secures his own safety and steals away White's base. White is on the spot. He tries to seal Black in with 78: this is the right shape but that's all. Black counters by taking aim at his thinness with the peep of 79.

White 80. Pushing down with 1 in *Dia. 9* is no good because of Black 2. After White links up with 3 and 5, Black 6 is a sharp blow. Black 10 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.


Black 81 breaks through the blockade. White can't resist; rather, he has to scramble to save his group with 82 on, which is painful. If instead White plays at 1 in *Dia. 10*, Black of course counters with 2. White can attack Black's eye

shape with 3, but he loses the capturing race after 14.



Dia. 10

also disastrous



Dia. 11

a Kamimura special

Up to 87, White has been cleanly split into two. Having to add an extra move at 88 in the corner at such a busy time is also painful. If he tenukies, the hane of Black A puts him on the spot — if White B, Black plays out at C.

Black has a secure grip on the lead. He now switches to 89 to 93 on the left side, but then switches back to the right side with 95 — the latter move is the main line. O's play around here is very skilful and shows what a 'clever competitor' (Kamimura) he is.

Instead of 90, the best White can do is to descend at D, as Black E will be sente. 'But White can't play D,' said Kamimura. 'White is inviting Black to play a ko.'

What happens if White uses 92 to cut at 1 in *Dia. 11*? Let's show you a Kamimura masterpiece.

Dia. 11. If White answers with 3 and 5, the rest is forced, leading up to the wedge of 10. If you got to play this in a game, you'd be remembered by later generations. [It's a variation of the Dosaku centre-of-symmetry tesuji.]

Figure 5 (101-145). *O takes control.*

Black 1 urges White to start moving. It's also 'censuring' White. When he plays 2, Black can calmly answer with 3. Playing 1 in *Dia. 12*, letting White play 2 and 4, is also conceivable. Even this is not bad for Black.

Black 5 is sente. Apparently O was relieved when he discovered Black 7. All the furious

fighting meant that the focus had become blurred.

Kato had regrets about White 8. If he had blocked at 1 in *Dia. 13*, the game would have been 'more drawn out'. Living with Black 2 is sente; if White 3, Black is completely secure after 4. He's left with the satisfying forcing move of 'a' and the cut at 'b'. Kamimura: 'White 8 is overdoing things, but you play moves like this when your position is bad.'





Figure 5 (101-145)


43: ko




Dia. 12: another option

White cuts at 10, desperately seeking complications, but things don't work out.

Black 15 and 17 are safety-first moves. White has no choice about fleeing with 20. The hane at 23 guarantees Black's safety. Even after 24, White is not completely secure.



Dia. 13: better for White



Dia. 14: good aji

'Pushing down with 27 is painstaking,' said Kamimura. If White answers with 1 in *Dia. 14*, Black captures him with good aji with 2 to 6.

Black 35 and 37 eliminate Black's last worries; the game has been decided. White 38 is White's 'last plea': please block at 39 and fight a ko.

White 44 eliminates ko threats and invites Black to cut at A. In response, Black 45 is a calm move; it also aims at White's defect at B.





Two wins in a row: O must have been very pleased with the way his Honinbo title defence had started. Watching (left of O) are Ishii Kunio 9-dan and (left of Kato) Goto Shungo 9-dan.




Figure 6 (146–200)

ko: 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72; 74: makes eyes;
75: ko; 78: ko; 80: connects (above 54)

Figure 6 (146–200). Winning the ko not enough

White 46 tries to enclose the left side on the largest scale possible. The only thing is that White has to permit Black 49.

Black cuts at 53 the moment White ataries at 52. Using the connection of 55 as a ko threat, he




Figure 7 (201–269)

ko: 32, 37, 40, 53, 56, 59, 62;
64: connects (at 29); 65: connects (at 4)

sets about wrapping up the game.

White can boast of excellent ko threats at the top. However, Black is not in a position in which he has to win the ko whatever happens. He's ready to give way at any time. That shows what a definite lead he has.

White ends the ko by connecting with 80, and Black secures his capture with 81. 'Taking the seven stones as compensation for the ko put me ahead,' said O, but this is the sort of [modest] comment only the actual player would make. The issue had been decided before this. White achieved his target of winning the ko, but he had fallen far behind and ended up losing by a big margin.

Figure 7 (201–269). Full speed ahead

O had made an excellent start to the match: he was steaming full speed ahead to his second title defence. Kamimura: 'Two successive losses is the stark reality, but if Kato takes each game as it comes and fights his hardest, we can look forward to the series going to the seventh game.'

Black wins by 13½ points.

(Gekkan Go Warudo, July 2002)

Game Three

Launching a counterattack

White: O Meien

Black: Kato Masao

Played at Aoshima Palm Beach Hotel, Miyazaki City on 6 & 7 June 2002.

Commentary by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. Report by Matsuura Takahito.




Figure 1 (1–20)


Figure 1 (1–20). Meien's world

With two wins under his belt, O innovates in the opening. The 6–4 point of 4 catches the eye,

but the real surprise comes with the knight's move of 10 in response to the double approach move. There's nothing to be dissatisfied with in the established strategy of White A, Black B, White 10. This move comes from the unique world of O Meien.

White 10 is probably a new move; Kato chooses the most natural answer with 11. He forces with 15, then adopts the direct approach with 17. This severity is typical of Kato, but I think Black could also have played 15 at C. If Black next plays 17, this will be harder on White than in the game, so he will play White D to forestall it; in this case, Black is left with the hane at 16 + connection.

If Black doesn't play 17 immediately, White will probably stake out a large position with E, a prospect Kato presumably disliked.



Dia. 1: too leisurely

Playing freely and imaginatively: this may look lighthearted, but it's surprisingly tiring. White can't afford to play the leisurely move of 18 at 1 in *Dia. 1*; if Black cuts through the middle with 2 and 4, the top left white group is clearly floating adrift. Note, too, the bottom left: the exchange of the marked stones is a plus for Black.

White 20 is an important move: White absolutely can't permit Black to break through here.






Figure 2 (21-40)




Dia. 2: no fun for Black
16: ko


Figure 2 (21-40). A spectacular trade

Early on in the game, a complicated reading contest has started. First of all, Black 21 at 1 in *Dia. 2* works badly when White cuts with 2. It's obvious that White can seal Black in up to 6; Black may strike at the gap with 7, but White is ready with the tesuji of 8 to 12. When White captures with 16, the corner is thin; Black won't enjoy this variation.

White 22. If at 23, Black will break through the encircling net by ramming into him with A. White sets out to cut with 24, after which the continuation is more or less a one-way street. However, even this is very difficult. Let's look at it carefully.



Dia. 3: disaster



Dia. 4: Black collapses

White 28 may be bad shape, but it's the only move. If instead White plays 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black 2 and 4 will give him a jolt. If White resists with 5 and 7, Black gets a ladder after 14.

Black 35 at B is out of the question: White 35. Black won't be completely alive without another move. Conversely, if White 36 at C, the hane of Black D becomes sente, so with B Black gets a living shape no one can interfere with.

Responding to White 36 by sacrificing four stones with 37 and 39 shows good judgement. If Black plays 37 at 1 in *Dia. 4*, White has the cleverly timed combination of 2 and 4: Black collapses.

Well, how should we view the result to 39? The on-the-spot opinion was: good for White. My reading is: good for Black. When opinion is divided like this, the conclusion is: even. Note, however, that there's life left in the four captured black stones.




Figure 3 (41-58)

Figure 3 (41-58). White takes the lead.

Let's have another think about the result at the top. White has captured four black stones. Moreover, the three black stones clinging to the


outside are doing no work at present. What Black has gained is only two white stones and the accompanying thickness.

If you looked just at these factors, you'd want to hold white. But the essence of this result is hiding at a deeper level. It's going to be revealed immediately.

Judging by his play in this figure, I'd say that Kato had confidence in his game. He pincers at 41 and steadily solidifies his base up to 53. He seems to be saying that his stomach is already full.

Black certainly is not dissatisfied with the trade to 53. However, isn't there something that strikes you about the tightness of White's play from 42 to 52? Right, he's desperately trying to take sente.

After all his hard work, he secures sente and switches to 58. This is big.



Dia. 5: best for Black 41

I think that the best move for 41 was Black 1 in *Dia. 5*. White 2 to 6 can be expected. Black next forces with 7, then takes up position with 11. This turns the upper right into the ideal box shape. It's much more attractive than White's flat position at the bottom. On top of that, it's hard for White to ignore 11 — if Black attaches at 'a', White will have to thrash around, giving Black even more thickness.

White 58 clearly eliminates the threat of *Dia. 5*. I think O's judgement in hastening to play this move is correct. He's still got the momentum built up in Games One and Two.

The result at the top is equal. If you compare Black's favourable result at the bottom and the value of White 58, you feel inclined to rule in favour of White. He has taken the lead.





Figure 4 (59-81)



Dia. 6: unreasonable for Black

Figure 4 (59-81). An over-radical invasion

O has accurately assessed the balance of power at the top, occupied a good point on the right side, and built up a favourable position. But in a flash, in this figure, he squanders his savings. The cause is setting his stone in motion with White 62.

I can accept one contact play at 60. At this point, O seems to have felt attracted to the idea of attacking the black group that has captured the two white stones.

Let's take a closer look. Black 67 is essential in reply to White 66. If instead Black tries to seal White in with 1 in *Dia. 6*, White easily breaks out. White 2 makes miai of capturing with 'a' and 4, so Black has no choice but to capture with 3. So White squeezes, then links up with 8. This would assure White of victory.


When White pokes his head out with 68, the top right black territory has suffered a major reduction. But White is not the only one to profit from this transaction. Black forces with 69 to 75, then switches to 77 and 79 on the right side —

it's now clear that the aggrieved party is White. When Black cuts at 81, he has reclaimed just as much as he lost at the top.

Instead of 62, White should put priority on the right side with 1 etc. in *Dia. 7*. If Black omits 4, White 4 will be severe, so the sequence to 5 can be expected.

A comparison with the figure makes everything clear at a glance. In *Dia. 7*, White has a lot of potential in the area extending from the bottom right into the centre, so you could say this keeps him in the lead.

Kato now decides the game brilliantly.



Dia. 7: White keeps the lead





Figure 5 (82–105)

Figure 5 (82–105). *Kato takes control.*

In accordance with his initial aim, White forces with 84, then puts pressure on the black

group at the top with 86. This is certainly very forceful, but the surrounding positions don't give White any help.



Dia. 8: curtains for Black if . . .

When Black moves out with 91, the game would be over if White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* worked. Kato is ready with the counter of 4 to 8. It is White who finds himself surrounded — he has no hope of winning a simple capturing race. Even if he manages to secure an eye somewhere, Black's hane at 'a' is absolute sente. In short, the worst that can happen to Black is a ko; it's impossible for White to get a favourable result.

White 92 is aiming at *Dia. 8*. If Black plays 93 at 94, White implements *Dia. 8*, and Black collapses. Please confirm for yourself that in this case the white group can extricate itself.

Kato is not going to go wrong in a position like this. He completes his *shinogi* with 93 and 97. Because of the cutting point at A, White can't omit 98 to 102. Black uses his sente to switch to 105, which is a declaration of victory. The remaining two figures show how solidly he plays in wrapping up the game.

Figure 6 (106–150), Figure 7 (151–195)

In retrospect, this game was crucial in changing the flow of the match. The difference between 0–3 and 1–2 is enormous.

White resigns after Black 195.
(*Gekkan Go Warudo*, August 2002).






Figure 6 (106-150)




Figure 7 (151-195)

61: ko; 87: connects

Game Four: Fierce fighting leads to a close game

White: Kato Masao

Black: O Meien

Played at Yu-no-yama Hot Spring, Mie Prefecture on 12 & 13 June 2002.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Inoue Yuji.

Figure 1 (1-21). An early skirmish

Black presumably planned to pincer at 11

when he played 7. Kamimura: 'In contemporary go, players don't worry so much about the corner.' If Black 11 at A, White can extend to B, but O has no intention of letting White do this. However, Black 11 is unusual — as a rule, it is played one line higher.






Figure 1 (1-21)



Dia. 1: White can cope




Dia. 2: a squeeze

Black develops quickly with the double approach move of 13. The fight that starts here continues along the left side and into the centre.

Black 21. 'White is not afraid of Black's pushing along and cutting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. When White cuts at 4, Black is short of liberties. If White can capture these two stones after 8, his result is good enough. If Black flees with 'a', White hanes at 'b' and can handle the fight.'

However, 'Black could have cut with 1 in *Dia. 2* (previous page).' After White 2 and 4, Black ataries at 5. After 12, Black cuts at 13 and should be able to squeeze on the outside in return for sacrificing four stones. Instead of 6 —



Dia. 3: no good for White

Dia. 3. If White moves out with 6 here, Black plays 7 and 9: White has to lose either one stone or two stones (the latter in a ladder).





Figure 2 (22—45)



Dia. 4: happy to sacrifice

Figure 2 (22–45). A good opening for White

The sequence to 26 has appeared in professional play.

Black seals White in by brute force with 27 and 29, but 'instead of 27, Black could also have extended at 34. If White 28, Black switches to 33.'


When Black plays 31, the marked stone (11) would be better one line higher . . . but this is easy to say in retrospect.

When Black develops rapidly with 33, anyone, not just Kato, would want to cut at 34. This cut at the corner of his shape makes Black thin.

Black 37 is a move with no substance. Kamimura: 'To take a guess at O's feelings, he was probably perplexed as to how to defend.' Going by the passive feel of Black's play around here, the opening is already not interesting for him.

White 38 is the vital point and the strongest move. White 40 is also severe. Kamimura: 'White 40 is full of fighting spirit. It's a good example of Kato's strength.' White 1 in *Dia. 4* lacks forcefulness. Black will counter at 2. If White cuts at 3, Black sacrifices up to 14 and can squeeze. This makes Black thick.

Black 45. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 5*, White will probably attack with the moves to 12. In the game, Black can't actually save the stone at 45, as White has sente moves at A and B, but Black gets an absolute sente move at C, so this is the safe way to play.



Dia. 5: not what Black wants

Figure 3 (46–70). White is doing well.

Black 51. Once again, Black has trouble de-

ciding how to cover his thinness at the bottom. His strategy of developing rapidly from the outset and parrying White's attacks is not working well.




Figure 3 (46-70)

White 54. White is doing well.

Black 55. Black could also flee with A. However, he is tempted to attach at 55, as he has the sente move of 57.

White 56 is actually severer than cutting the knight's move with White 59.

White 64, the sealed move, is predictable but nonetheless severe. It naturally defends the centre white group while attacking Black. White's group is strong, Black's weak.





Figure 4 (71-100)

Figure 4 (71-100). Black in trouble


Black 71 is a startling move but a good one. It's hard to find a move like this, as it's like banging one's head against a brick wall. If White answers at 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black cuts at 2, then 4; if White 'a', Black 'b' threatens either 'c' or 'd' next.



Dia. 6: good for Black


However, White is ready with the well-timed peep of 72. 'Strongman Kato is back,' said Kamimura. White forces Black to connect at 73, then gives way with 74.

Black pins his hopes on the 83-85 combination, but he can't use 89 to block at 90: White counters with 2 in *Dia. 7*, making miai of 'a' and 'b'.



Dia. 7

Black has no answer



Dia. 8

more than good enough

Both sides poke their heads out with 90 and 91, but this exchange is favourable for White.

Black 93. If Black blocks 92 (that is, plays one line lower), White cuts at 98. Having to dodge to 93 shows that things are bad for Black.

White 94. Kamimura: 'Even just playing 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* would be overwhelmingly favourable for White.'





Figure 5 (101-140)



Dia. 9: Kobayashi's proposal


Figure 5 (101-140). Kato's erratic play confuses the issue.

From 1 here, Black starts to switch to territory. However, White has more secure territory, so all he has to do is to play thickly and hang on to his lead.


White 4 is a little slack — if White pushed down (to the right of 100), Black would be on the spot.

White's attempt to play a semi-forcing move with 14 is rash . . . Black has the counterattack of 15. Instead of 14, extending at 22 would have made White thick — not the one-space jump of A, as moves like Black 19 would aim at wedging in at 22.

Kamimura: 'Kobayashi Koichi Gosei advocated forcing with 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, then jumping to 5.' This is a practical way of settling the shape, typical of Kobayashi. The only thing is that it sets Black's mind at rest by giving him eye shape; losing the sente move of White 34 is also regrettable.



Dia. 10: good for Black



Dia. 11: good for Black

White tries to play even more efficiently with 14, but this runs into a counterattack. Playing any more moves here won't achieve anything. If White 16 at 1 in Dia. 10, Black attaches at 2 and keeps sente up to 7. If White changes 3 to 3 in Dia. 11, Black sacrifices two stones and again keeps sente.

White switches to 16, but he has started to play erratically. On top of that, Black's next move, 17, is good style.

White 22. If omitted, Black 22-White B-Black C is perfect for Black.

Black switches to 23, making 16 a bad move; the game has been thrown into confusion.

Black 29 is very big — compare White D. O probably felt he'd taken the lead.

Figure 6 (141-169). Difficult comparisons

When so much of the board has been settled, you can calculate to some degree of accuracy which points are big, so you have to agonize over the choice between one-point or half-point alternatives.

There are seven significant points: 41, 44, 45, 51, 52, 63, 69. With time running out, one can't expect perfect play.

'I can't accept that the descent of 45 is a good move,' said Kamimura. 'I'd prefer to force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, then take up position with 5.'






Figure 6 (141-169)



Dia. 12: better for Black 45



Dia. 13: crawling is big

Or: 'Crawling at Black 56 also looks big,' he said. 'Even instead of 53 or 55, surely Black 1 in Dia. 13 would have been bigger.' If White 'a', attaching at Black 'b' becomes possible.

O went into byo-yomi while thinking about Black 63. That means that he played 63 and 65 in byo-yomi. He probably believed that this gave him a win.

White 66 was considered a good move by the pros examining the game at the tournament venue.

Black forced with 67, then blocked at 69 at the bottom, but the latter move was queried. Was it the losing move?

Black A instead looks bigger. If Black hadn't played the forcing sequence from 45 to 50, it would be even bigger...





Figure 7 (170-200)



Dia. 14: Black can't resist

Figure 7 (170-200). The issue is decided.

White 70 decides the game. White 74 is the vital point: Black has no choice about 75 and 77. If he resists with 75 at 1 in Dia. 14, White can wedge in at 2. The continuation is forced, the result bad for Black.

Playing the moves to 82 in sente is a success for White.

The question arises of what would have happened if Black had played the marked stone (69) at 72. White would crawl on the second line (where the marked stone is), and it can't be clearly established that Black would win the game. The pros on the spot reached the same conclusion: the lead is unclear.

Kamimura: 'To quote Kobayashi Gosei again, his opinion was that White would have been a

half point thicker* even if Black had played 69 at 72.'

When White switches to the cut of 86, he is thicker. The result is a win with the komi.




Figure 8 (201-237)
32: connects



Kato evens the score.

Figure 8 (201-237). Close but decisive

Kamimura: 'For the first time in a while, Kato has shown us some powerful go like that of Honinbo Jowa. Watching the game on TV, I got the feeling he was in good physical shape. Black may have slipped up in the opening, but still Kato

*The term 'thick' in this sense means 'ahead', but it is not as definite as saying that a player is winning.

deserves praise for his good play.'

White wins by 1½ points.

(Gekkan Go Warudo, August 2002).

Game Five: The key game

White: O Meien

Black: Kato Masao

Played at the Grand Hotel New Oji, Tomakomai City, Hokkaido on 26 & 27 June 2002.

Commentary by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. Report by Matsuura Takahito.

Figure 1 (1-13). A dubious special strategy

Black 1 and 3 are one of Kato's favourite opening patterns. O, as we well know by now, is fond of the large knight of 6. However, it backfires against him in this game.

Please pay attention to the upper right. White 12 should strike you as dubious. As everyone knows, the joseki is White A, followed by Black B. Locally, the result is even, but it doesn't suit this game.






Figure 1 (1-13)



Dia. 1
good for Black



Dia. 2
good for White

Dia. 1. The invasion of Black 1 is a threat. Even though White emphasizes thickness up to 10, his whole group will come under attack after Black 11. At one stroke, this will spoil White's game.

Dia. 2. If White 6 in the figure is the marked stone here, there's a difference. After 7, White forces with 8, then hanes at 10. White can now boast of excellent thickness.

I've seen White 12 before, in one of Take-miya's games. Of course, playing like this is possible, but in this game White is constrained by 6 to play this variation. I don't feel that it's a natural flow.

When White plays 12, Black will be in a hurry to extend to 13. Now a question for the reader: where would you play White's next move? Black has tenukied in the top right, so naturally . . .





Figure 2 (14-31)



Dia. 3: better for 14

Figure 2 (14-31). Black races ahead.


O chose White 14. A perfect checking extension? No, no, to be severe, this is a submissive

move. The ideal shape for White is making a pincer at A before Black has played the marked stone.

I'd prefer to use 14 to attach at 1 in *Dia. 3*. If Black 2, White presses him hard with 3. Black may come out with 4 and 6, but if White captures with 7 he has no reason to be dissatisfied. White 11 is the key point for eye shape for both sides. As far as the right side is concerned, this would make good balance with the large-knight move in the bottom right. When Black attaches at 15 in the game, the state of affairs is the opposite. Black's corner group has no worries; in contrast, White has no base, so he can't omit 16.

White applies pressure with 18, but you can't tell who is on the offensive. The diagonal move of 19 is a stylish probe: it nullifies the threat of White B and threatens to link up with C. If White plays C, Black's aim is to attack White with D.

O forces with 20 and 22 without regrets, then seals Black in with 24. He has obtained an equal result, if you just look at the top right. But here again the marked white stone is a burden — ideally, it should be located at E. When Black jumps to 25, White can't contrive a way for his thickness to work effectively.



Dia. 4: a revised strategy

White 26. Perhaps White has no choice but to revise his strategy, forcing with 1 in *Dia. 4*, then switching to the left side with 3 and 5. When Black plays 27 and 29 in the game, he has developed more rapidly than White.

The shoulder hit of Black 31 is an interesting move. Black is going all out both on the left side and at the bottom.






Figure 3 (32-70)



Dia. 5: the correct direction of play



Dia. 6: White welcomes the fight

Figure 3 (32-70). Kato's first dubious move

The game proceeds just as Kato planned up to 39. Although Black helps White to strengthen his bottom left group, Black also gets solid shape; he has a recognizable lead.

White 40 is a natural defensive move, but now the marked stone loses much of its raison

d'être. If White had 40 in place first, he'd prefer to invade (left of 61) rather than play the marked stone. It would be odd if playing two badly balanced moves (White 28 and White 6) in the opening *didn't* hurt your game.

Everything has been smooth sailing for Kato up until this point, but now his first dubious move makes its appearance. Black 49 is the wrong direction. Instead, Black should defend at 1 in *Dia. 5*. White 'a' won't pose any threat at all to Black's group at the bottom. Black can look forward to expanding his left side with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black 63. Black 1 in *Dia. 6* will lead to confused fighting after 2 to 6. This will be welcomed by the side with an unfavourable position, White.

Black chooses the surer path with 63, but the atmosphere is a little disagreeable when White invades at 70. If Black had followed *Dia. 5*, he wouldn't have had to worry about this invasion.

From this point, O begins his counterattack.





Figure 4 (71-100)

Figure 4 (71-100). White catches up.

An immediate attempt to capture the invader won't work. Black 85, for example, runs out of steam at once when White hanes at 84. Making a diversionary attack on the top left corner with 71 is a natural decision. After White defends the top with 74, Black compromises with 75. Satisfied with the 'apology', White switches to 76, a move that relies on his reinforcement at 74.

At this point, Black plays a good move: 77. If he makes the ordinary answer at A, White takes profit with B—Black C—White D; on top of that,



Dia. 7: White doesn't gain

Black loses his eye shape.

White 78. If at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black is ready with the sequence to 12. White can't claim that he's taken any profit: he's just crawled along the first and second lines.

This is discouraging for O just as he's working up a counterattack, but he plays patiently with 78 to 82; then, when Black plays 83, he challenges him to a fight by pulling out his stone with 84. Note that the peep at 86 is essential — if White played 88 immediately, he would collapse when Black pressed at E.

Black tries to pull something off in the corner with 97 on, but —

Figure 5 (101–131). Black misses a chance.

White makes good use of his earlier move (at 74) and defuses the attack up to 10, then gets sente to switch to 12. Splitting Black into two with this move suddenly makes the game very close.

A violent fight continues after this — the first side to make a slip will immediately collapse. Black 15 may look slow, but it's the only move. If instead Black plays 1 in *Dia. 8*, White will lash out with 2. Black may resist with 3 and 5, but 6 and 8 work perfectly for White. In a flash, White stages an upset.

O is in the process of recovering from his inferior start. Soon after this, he does upset Black's lead, but he then crumbles after just one move.

White displays good judgement with 16. It's tempting to jump to A as soon as he can, but if Black then plays at 17, White has to defend at 16 anyway. In that case, holding back at 16 so that he can aim at jumping to B is a smarter strategy.

Black 21–23 and White 22–24 are a kind of trade.

Black 27 is probably the move that gives White the chance to pull off an upset. If instead Black made a diagonal move at 1 in *Dia. 9*, forestalling White 'a' and aiming at pulling out his two stones with 'b', he should have been able to walk away with the game. If White answered

Black 1 by defending at 'b', Black could then play 'c' (27 in the figure).






Figure 5 (101–131)



Dia. 8: a major upset



Dia. 9: Black's chance to wrap up the game



For the first time, Kato takes the lead in the series.






Figure 6 (132-167)



Dia. 10: disaster for Black



Dia. 11: White wins

Figure 6 (132-167). *O* stumbles within sight of victory.

Up to 34, White makes centre thickness, then with 42 to 46 a white territory of over ten points appears. This is an upset. However, *O* stumbles in wrapping up the game. White 50, striking at Black's bad aji at the bottom, is good, but 52 is the losing move.

Correct is White 1 in *Dia. 10*. If Black 2, White 3 is a good counter; the moves to 11 are

well timed. After 15, living with White 'a' and winning the capturing race with 'b' are miai.

Best for Black are 2 and 4 in *Dia. 11*; he is able to capture White up to 20. However, White plays the endgame here in sente, then switches to 21 at the top, which gives him a win by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points or at least by half a point.

In the game, there is no endgame aji left and White also loses the capturing race.

Losing the key game of the series so far in this fashion must have been painful. However, his recovery from his bad opening is a plus factor for O. Last year he recovered from a 2-3 deficit to defend his title, so there's no saying what will happen.

White resigns after Black 167.

(Gekkan Go Warudo, August 2002)

Game Six Triumph for a veteran

White: Kato Masao

Black: O Meien

Played in the Gyokei Building, Choshi City, Chiba Prefecture on 10 & 11 July 2002.

Commentary by Kato Masao. Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.





Figure 1 (1-14)


Figure 1 (1-14). Weakness of the small knight

O Meien changes his opening a little each game. In answer to Black 5, I wondered whether

to play the high move of 1 in *Dia. 1*. When I played 6 in the game, I thought Black might play the high Chinese opening of 7. The reason is that it's easy for Black to counter 8 and 10 with his own pincer at 11, as 13 is more or less sente against the corner. When White has played the high move of 1 in *Dia. 1*, it's hard for Black to play at 2, because the high move is more convenient for attacking Black after 3 and 5. Therefore, Black will perhaps take up position with 2 at 'a' or 5. White makes an approach move at 'b', and a different game follows.




Dia. 1: fuseki considerations



Dia. 2: weak point of the small knight

In response to Black 13, White 14 is a necessary move. This could be called the weak point of the small-knight's move at 6. If instead White plays, for example, 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will immediately attack with 2 and 4; if White 5, the situation is out of his control after Black cuts at 6. If White has a stone at 'a', there's no problem: White 'b'.

Dia. 3 (next page). There are a number of games in which White forces with 1 before jumping to 3. This eliminates the worry of *Dia. 2*. However, though it's sente, the exchange for 2 is painful. It makes Black thick. That means that one's own army becomes relatively weaker.



Dia. 3: a painful exchange





Figure 2 (15-30)



Dia. 4: not interesting for White

Figure 2 (15-30). An unthinking forcing move

White has stored up strength with the marked stone, so reinforcing the thinness of Black's two-space jump is urgent. I was wondering how Black would go about it when he made the shoulder hit of 15. This is the first time I've seen it, but it

looks feasible. It's probably a good move.

White 16. I had doubts about pushing up with 1 in *Dia. 4*. Turning will be a good move for Black at any point, so having played 1 White has to continue with 3 and 5. Black will probably next play the ticklish move of 6, which also strengthens his bottom area. That's why I chose 16 in the figure.


I expected 17; my plan was to answer with 18 on. Black got good shape up to 23, but I felt I had to accept this. It couldn't be helped.

The diagonal move of 24 may look natural, but I thought about it for a while (13 minutes). The move I'd have liked to play was White 26, but sealing White in with Black 24 would have been just too good, so I had no choice but to abandon it.


Perhaps O read my thoughts. Anyway, he thought for a really long time on 25. The conventional move would probably be Black A; in this case, I planned to play at 26. The presence of 24 makes quite a difference. If instead Black played 25 at 28, I'd probably play once at White A before playing 26.

Black 25 takes away White's base and serves to some degree to reinforce Black's own position. Of course, it also aims at cutting at B.

Black 25 at 1 in *Dia. 5* is uninteresting. White ignores it in favour of jumping to 2; if Black then cuts at 3, White pushes down with 4 and 6, giving Black bad shape.



Dia. 5: bad shape for Black



Dia. 6: submissive for White


White 26. White 1 in *Dia. 6* lets Black force with 2 and 4, moves that also create some extra

eye-making potential for Black.


With these thoughts crossing my mind, I casually pressed at 26, but this move was awful. It was the main factor in making the game tough for me.

To tell the truth, I hadn't noticed Black's 31-33 combination in the next figure. If I had, I would never have made the stupid exchange of 26 for 27.

Instead of 26, simply jumping to 1 in *Dia. 7* is superior. What happens if, even so, Black attacks with 4 and 6? White ataries at 7, then —



Dia. 7: better for White



Dia. 8: bad for Black

Dia. 8. The descent of 1 is sente, but this in itself is not enough to make the cut of 3 much of a threat. Or, rather, the cut hurts Black's own position. White counters with 4 to 8, making miai of pushing up at White 9 and attaching at 12.

Figure 3 (31-51). *O* takes the lead.

In the game, Black has got the marked stone (27) in place, so he can easily cut at 41. White's group is left without much of a base while Black links up his groups, making him thick.

Note that if White played 36 at 40, neither Black 37 nor 39 would be sente, so it would be harder for Black to cut at 41. However, Black would get to connect at 36, leaving him with Black A; this would be hard for White to bear.

The only redeeming feature for White is that 42 and 44 work, though just barely. They set up living with B for later. However, this is not enough to upset Black's lead.






Figure 3 (31-51)



Dia. 9: Black can't resist



Dia. 10: White lives

Let's show that Black 43 and 45 are correct. Trying to capture White with Black 1 in *Dia. 9* doesn't work well. After 6, Black pretty well has to connect at 1 in *Dia. 10*. The sequence to 12 is one possible continuation: the key is getting to connect at 8. If this connection weren't sente, Black would kill White with the placement at 'a'.

We resume the fuseki with 46, but the cap of 49 is perfect. This is severe: not only does it attack the white group, it also reinforces the right side. And, above all else, White has to worry about a black invasion around C. Whatever happens, White has to avoid letting Black build centre thickness as a prelude to such an invasion.

There are other possibilities for 49 and 51, which we will look at over the page.





Figure 4 (49-68)
(49 and 50 repeated)




Dia. 11: also feasible for Black

Figure 4 (49-68). Black gets all the good moves.

Black 49 is an excellent move, but Black could peep at 1 in *Dia. 11* first. The aim of White 50 is to forestall this peep. Black forces White to connect at 2 in the diagram, then caps at 3. This is a perplexing position for White. One possibility is to force with 4 and 6, then to cut with 8 and 10. In response, Black will probably treat his single stone lightly, dropping back to 11. In other words, he takes the outside. White has to add a stone to secure the capture of the black stone, after which a black invasion at 'a' will be a real threat. What's more, White is not happy about

exerting strength on almost valueless moves like 4 and 6. Instead of 4 —



Dia. 12: Black is satisfied

Dia. 12. White could attach at 1, with the aim of moving out into the top centre. However, Black just makes the natural responses shown here, and the result is not appealing for White.


At the time, I couldn't think of any good alternatives to these two diagrams. I wonder what I would have done if Black had actually peeped.

Of course, the simple cap at 49 is also not bad for Black. If White answers at A, Black plays B, and White has just needlessly helped Black to strengthen himself. White 50 may have forestalled the peep, but moving out with 54 to 60 doesn't feel very good. The well-timed move of 55 takes a firm grip on the single white stone.


Considering that Black has made himself heavy with 51 and 53, White could now consider peeping at C, that is, 4 in *Dia. 11*. However, the way things are now, Black probably won't answer C. Instead, he will probably jump to D. That lets White link up with E, but the result is that White has just played on dame points.

White jumps out to 60. This is a good time to check the eye shape of his group. If Black wants to attack it, 1 and 3 in *Dia. 13* are severe. Black 3 threatens 'a', so White can't omit 4. Black 5 is now the vital point. It's true White can push through at 'b', but all this does is get one eye in gote. The only thing is that Black has omitted 'c' in order to attack, so this loses points. That means that Black will be reluctant to play this way.

Black 61 is also severe. White answers cautiously with 62 and 64 to make sure his large group is not attacked. In answer to 67, White 68 is virtually a do-or-die move. Simply defending against the cut (between 61 and 65) would be hopeless. White tries to maintain territorial balance, leaving the centre decision up to Black.



Dia. 13: attacking White's eye shape



Dia. 14: not inviting

In a sense, I switched to the top right corner because I didn't have any decent moves in the centre. To go back a little, if, instead of 62, White defends the top left with 1 in *Dia. 14*, Black is left with the invasion point of 'a'; in the meantime, attacking with 2 looks good. If White's escape routes are blocked, the above-mentioned attack of Black 'b' to 'd' becomes a threat.

Figure 5 (69–81). White lives, but . . .

Locally, the moves to 76 seems appropriate. If Black plays 73 at 1 in *Dia. 15*, then, after White lives with 2 and 4, he is left with the aji of the clamp at 'a' and the cut at 'b'.

After 76, the white group is provisionally settled, but Black can look forward to playing at 1 in *Dia. 16*. If White just rams into Black with 2, then tenukies, he can't get two eyes here, yet jumping out to 'a' would be likely to have an adverse effect in the centre. White would probably have to answer 3 by playing White 5.






Figure 5 (69–81)



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

4: elsewhere

I was resigned to having Black play 77. If instead Black plays at A, White cuts with 78–Black 79–White 77 and settles the group.

I thought that I had no choice about White 78 and 80, but I didn't know what to make of Black 81. O presumably planned to lightly discard the marked stone. Even that way, Black would still have the lead, but he could have played much more severely.





Figure 6 (81-110)
(81 repeated) 96: connects



Dia. 17: wrapping up the game

Figure 6 (81-110). The tables are turned.

How should Black have played with 81? First, force with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 17*, then pull out the centre top stone with 5 and 7. Next, Black 9 is severe. Once the centre white group is cut off, its status becomes dubious, so White has no choice but to reinforce with 10 (or 'a'). Black then moves out with 11, and there is nothing that White can do. He has little choice but to play 12 — if instead White plays 13, Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd' puts him on the spot.


In *Dia. 17*, White is not alive at the top; moreover, Black naturally slides into the left side. If you compare this to what happens in the

game, the difference is clear. Apparently O said that he expected White to answer 81 with A.

Black 83 is also awful: 84 is the vital point. White 84 sets up White B, so Black rushes to fix up his shape with 85. Instead of swaggering around, Black is feeling harassed. No matter how you look at it, this is strange.

If Black was prepared to sacrifice his stone anyway, he should have used 83 to play the hane of 1 in *Dia. 18* without regrets. White has to add a stone at 2. If Black next switches to the aforementioned sente moves of 3 and 5, then crawls at 7, he will keep his lead without giving White any opening to exploit. If White 8, Black 9. Once again, compare this to what happens in the game.

O's erratic play with 81 and 83 came as a complete surprise to me.



Dia. 18: a win for Black


In this series, most of the games, whether they were the ones I won or the ones I lost, were upsets. This game is no exception. For part of the way, I thought the game was bad for me, that the match was going to go to the seventh game. Then, suddenly, O started playing erratically.

Look at what is happening. Black is intent on securing his own safety. White just goes along with him and becomes incredibly thick up to 100. He can enclose territory on the 5th line with 104. Black is not permitted to encroach more deeply than 105. You can see what a difference this is from *Dias. 17* and 18.

There's a 'but', however. I was so happy that I played 104 without thinking. Big as this is, playing on the right side, where Black has

neglected to play his forcing moves, is even bigger. If White 1 in *Dia. 19*, Black may play 2, but White continues with 3. This is clearly a shortcut to victory. When Black forces with 107, White may be ahead, but the game is countable.

The only remaining large point is in the bottom right corner.



Dia. 19: an easy win for White





Figure 7 (111-160)

Figure 7 (111-160). An easier way of winning

Actually, there's a reason why O had hesitated to make the forcing move of 107 in the previous figure. He didn't want White to get a stone at 110 there. The reason is that White 11, with its threat of A, becomes sente. That's why he was in a hurry to play at 11 himself.

I answered at 12, permitting Black 13. This was because I felt that this was good enough for White anyway, but Takagi Shoichi 9-dan, the referee, later pointed something out to me.

Takagi suggested that White could have switched to 1 in *Dia. 20*. If Black 2, White lives with 3 and 5. Black will then stop White from coming in by playing 6 and 8, but White makes an eye in sente. White could use his sente to live in the bottom right with 13 on. I accept this may have been the best sequence for White, but, as I mentioned, I believed I could win with the sequence in the figure.



Dia. 20: best for White

O probably had no choice about playing 11 in the figure. If instead he plays at 13, White 11 forces Black A.

White 28 is a mistake: it should be at 29. Because of 28, White's left-side territory is pressed down and Black gets not inconsiderable territory in the centre. This miscalculation is what makes the game really close.

Figure 8 (161-200) (next page). Another slip

White 92 is small. Instead, White should crawl at A; if Black 92, White plays B. This is an improvement on the figure. However, by this point, the game is a sure win for White, though it's close.

Figure 9 (201-244). Honinbo Kensei again

I was happy just to become the challenger. To win the match, after losing the first two games, is an unlooked-for success.




Figure 8 (161–200)
100: ko (at 96)




Figure 9 (201–244)

However, there are players older than I who are still going strong, and I myself believe that I can get stronger. The only secret is study. Winning this title will spur me on to seek further improvement.

White wins by 1½ points.

(*Gekkan Go Warudo*, September 2002. Honinbo report translated by John Power.)

Note: As Honinbo, Kato has resumed the name of Kensei that he took when he first won the title in 1977. This name is used in a couple of ways. Kato can be referred to as ‘Honinbo Ken-

sei’ in the old style, though this practice has become rarer in recent decades. In tournament lists, he is referred to as Kato Kensei Honinbo.

Kato previously held the Honinbo title for three years before losing it to Takemiya in 1980. This gap of 22 years before making a comeback is the record for any title, as we noted in the news section of GW95. However, we got a detail wrong. The previous record was not 12 years, as we claimed, but 21 years. It is shared by the two Kansai Ki-in Hashimotos, Utaro and Shoji, and they both set it in the Oza title.

Go World News: continued from page 40

News from China

New face wins individual championship

A new star, Xie He, an 18-year-old 5-dan, won the Chinese Individual Championship, held in Zhengdu from 14 to 27 September. Xie scored 9–2 to take first place in the 120-player field. Second was Peng Quan 5-dan, who also scored 9–2. Both these players will represent China in next year’s Fujitsu Cup.

Summer promotions

This year’s rating tournament was held for 36 days, starting on 11 July, in Hangzhou City, with 512 players participating. The 49 promotions included the following:

To 9-dan: Luo Xihe

To 7-dan: Hu Yaoyu, Lin Zhaohua, Kong Jie

To 6-dan: Huang Yizhong.

A professional qualifying tournament was also held, with an astonishing 364 participants, of whom 20 made shodan.

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Practice must also include repetition if it is to be effective. If you have to find the same kind of tesuji in similar patterns over and over again, spotting that tesuji in a problem or in an actual game will become second nature. It is the purpose of this series to provide a vast number and a large variety of problems — in every phase of go, from the opening to the endgame — for amateur players to practice their go technique. To accommodate so many problems, the explanations are minimal and limited to either illustrating a fundamental principle or a tesuji. Readers are expected to make the effort to verify that the answer to each problem is indeed the best and most profitable move, and to prove to themselves that any other move fails to achieve the stated objective. This effort is also part of the practice that these problems provide. This is not an easy task: it requires mental discipline. But doing it will not only improve your go, it will also improve your mental powers.

The problems are not hard: they range from very easy to moderately difficult. A dan player should be able to solve them within a minute, sometimes on sight, but it may take a bit longer for kyu-level players. But even if you are a dan player, solving these problem will keep your go sharp and give you the competitive edge that you need to win your games.

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Mastering the Basics, Volume Three

Making Good Shape

by Rob van Zeijst and Richard Bozulich

Good shape is a subject that has received scant attention in Japanese go literature. Although references to shape can be found in most books, there is no one book devoted exclusively to this subject. However, understanding and recognizing good shape is important for becoming a strong player and developing the intuition that will instantly guide you to finding the strongest moves in the opening and the middle-game fighting.

The brain is made up of two hemispheres whose functions are different but complementary. The right hemisphere is superior in handling geometrical concepts and the left hemisphere is superior in handling analytical processes. Playing go involves an interesting interplay between these two abilities. The right hemisphere provides the geometrical vision necessary to see the shape that you wish to achieve while the left hemisphere provides the analysis that is needed to achieve that shape. Studying shape is an excellent vehicle for developing and integrating both the geometrical and analytical powers of the brain.

The first chapter begins with an extensive theoretical introduction to shape, beginning with the efficient placement of stones. It then goes on to discuss thickness — how to use it and how to counter it, and how, if used improperly, it can result in the overconcentration of stones. It continues by contrasting the concept of thick stones with that of thin stones, then finally explains what are heavy stones and what are light stones, and how these relate to the important concept of sabaki, which is essentially a method for making good shape.

The second chapter gives examples of the standard shapes, both good and bad, such as ponnuki, empty triangles, the center of three stones, the head of two and three stones, etc.

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
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Tesuji Problems (1)


This is the first instalment of a series of articles on tesuji. In each issue we will concentrate on a particular kind of move, such as, attachments, hanes, cuts, jumps, etc. The key move in all of the problems below is atari, but you have to make the right one to succeed. All problems are taken from the Nihon Ki-in publication Tesuji Encyclopedia. This massive work contains 2,638 examples, covering every kind of tesuji in various settings. It can be ordered on Kiseido's web site at <http://www.kiseido.com/d.htm>. Answers begin on the next page.

Problem 1. Black to play




How can Black kill White's corner group?

Problem 2. Black to play




How can Black secure his stones?

Problem 3. White to play




How can White kill the black stones?

Problem 4. Black to play




How should Black secure his stones?

Problem 5. Black to play




How should Black attack the white stones?

Problem 6. White to play




How can White live with his stones?

Problem 7. Black to play



What is the best way for Black to secure the corner?


Problem 8. Black to play



How should Black settle his stones at the top?


Tesuji Problems: Answers

Problem 1



Correct Answer


The atari of Black 1 kills the white stones. If White captures with 2, Black extends to 3 and White can't make two eyes in the corner.



Variation


If White answers Black 1 by extending to 2, Black ataries with 3. If White 4, Black connects with 5. White must turn at 6 to save his three stones, but Black takes the corner by capturing four stones with 7 and linking up all his stones.

Problem 2



Correct Answer


Black must first atari with 1, then cast a net with 3. If White tries to escape with 4 and 6, Black 7 leaves White without a response.



Variation 8: connect (above 2)


If White captures a stone with 4, Black squeezes with the sequence to 9. After White connects with 10, Black plays 11 and the white stones are dead.

Problem 3



Correct Answer


The atari underneath of White 1 kills the black stones. If Black connects with 2, the placement of 3 is the vital point. Trying to make another eye with 4 is futile. After White 5, Black can't defend that eye. If Black plays 2 at 4, White A kills the black stones.



Ko is a failure


If White ataris with 1, Black can live if he wins the ko starting with 2. If White plays 1 at A, Black ataris with B. After White captures, Black can get two eyes by making an eye with 2.

Problem 4



Correct Answer

Black should first atari with 1, then block with 3. If White ataries with 4, Black can link up with 5 and 7. By first exchanging 1 for White 2, Black secures the corner territory.



Failure

Connecting with Black 1 lets White take the corner. After White 4, there is no way that Black can prevent White from linking.

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
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
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Problem 5



Correct Answer


Black first ataris with 1 then cuts with 3. White must capture with 4, enabling Black to play 5 and 7. The three white stones on the right are dead.



Failure


The atari of 1 does not lead to a good result for Black. White can link up all his stones with the sequence to 6. Black makes a wall by connecting at 7, but there is still a cut at A that White can aim at.

Problem 6



Correct Answer


White first ataries with 1 and 3. Black must play 4 to prevent White from getting a second eye on the left, but White hugs the black stone on the right with 5. If Black ataries with 6, White 7 leaves Black without a response. If he captures the white stone in atari, White recaptures in a snapback.



Failure: White dies


If White ataries with 1, Black has to extend to 2. Against White 3, Black descends to 4, and White must connect with 5. After Black 6, White's stones are dead. Black 4 at 5 also kills White: White answers with 4, and Black descends to A.

Problem 7



Correct Answer 10: connects (left of 6)


Black should atari underneath with 1, then crawl to 3. If White 4, Black blocks with 5 and squeezes with the sequence to 9. After White connects with 10, Black extends to 11. Black has secured the corner and he has good shape in the center.



Failure


The atari of Black 1 is the usual move, but White would sacrifice two stones, then force with 4 to 8. Compared with the correct answer, White's stones are thick; Black's are overconcentrated and are not projecting influence into the center.

Problem 8



Correct Answer

Black should first atari with 1, then drive through White's position with 3 and 5. After White 6, Black can break through White's position on the right with 7.



Failure

Black 1 is not good because it allows White to play a forcing move at A. Now a black atari at B does not have the same effect as it does in the correct answer.

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